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ARTICLES
Sexual Reorientation
ELIZABETH

M.

GLAZER*

There has been a recent shift in the political and legal treatmentof bisexuals.
Since Ruth Colker Naomi Mezey, and Kenji Yoshino began writing about the
phenomenon of bisexual erasure and the resulting invisibility of the bisexual
from sexual-orientationlaw and the LGBT rights movement, something strange
has happened. Bisexuality is suddenly hypervisible. And not just on Glee or in
The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo. Or even in the 2010 national sex survey
reporting that of the seven percent of the population identifying as nonheterosexual,forty percent of the men and a large majority of the women identified as
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bisexual. Bisexuality is now also hypervisible in the law. Recent cases have
arisen where plaintifs have alleged discriminationon the basis of their bisexual
orientationsand where plaintifs have been required to prove that they are "gay
enough" to merit protectionfrom discrimination.Yet despite this hypervisibility,
the law has failed to address the harms that bisexuals face. The problem stems
from the law's current definition of "sexual orientation," which provides the
basis for an actionable discrimination claim. This definition includes only
extreme orientations like homosexuality and heterosexuality but, for all practical purposes, excludes bisexuality.
This Article offers an alternative definition by introducing the distinction
between an individual's General Orientation and Specific Orientation.An individual's General Orientationis the sex toward which the individual is attracted
the majority of the time. An individual's Specific Orientation is the sex of the
individual's desiredor actualpartner(s). Whereas for many the two orientations
are identical, for bisexuals the two orientations often difer If adopted, this
alternativedefinition would reorient the concept of sexual orientation under the
law. It would offer to the LGBT rights movement, to legislatures, and to courts
the opportunity to protect against discriminationon the basis of sexual orientation as it is actually lived, rather than on the basis of sexual orientationas the
law has until now imagined it to be. It could also offer to antidiscriminationlaw
a model for the protection of living identities, with respect to sexual orientation
but also with respect to other identity categories.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been a recent shift in the political and legal treatment of bisexuals. Since
Ruth Colker,' Naomi Mezey,2 and Kenji Yoshino 3 began writing about the phenom-

1. See Run COLKER, HYBRID: BisExuALs, MuITRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
15-38 (1996) (introducing a perspective that "reject[s] conventional bipolar categories in the areas of
gender, race, and disability"); Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender and Disability, 56
OHio ST. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1995) (same).
2. See Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity
ClassificationBased on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 98, 100-03 (1995).
3. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
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enon of bisexual erasure and the resulting invisibility of the bisexual from sexualorientation law and the LGBT4 rights movement, something strange has happened.
Bisexuality is suddenly hypervisible. And not just on Glee5 or in The Girl with the
Dragon Tattoo.6 Or in the 2010 national sex survey conducted by Indiana University
reporting that of the seven percent of the population identifying as nonheterosexual,
forty percent of the men and a large majority of the women identified as bisexual.7 Or
even in the Bi Social Network's-the first interactive bisexual network-viral-video
series entitled IAm Visible, which began in November 2010 in an effort "to showcase
bis as having a place to be themselves."8
In addition to its hypervisibility in the public sphere, bisexuality is now also
hypervisible in the law. Recent cases have arisen where plaintiffs have alleged
discrimination on the basis of their bisexual orientations and where plaintiffs
have been required to prove that they are "gay enough" to merit protection from
discrimination. Consider Apilado v. North American Gay Amateur Athletic
Alliance,9 a sexual-orientation-discrimination suit filed in April 2010 against a
4. At this point, it behooves me to drop the obligatory footnote on naming that often accompanies
articles of this genre. At times in this Article I refer to "gays and lesbians," at other times to "sexual
minorities," and at other times to the "LGBT" initialism, which indicates the collection of sexual
minorities that includes gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people. Though this initialism omits
groups such as intersex people and those who identify as queer, I have decided to use it in this Article
because it is the term most often used in connection with the current political movement for rights
related to sexual orientation and gender identity. For further information about my thoughts on the
importance of naming in legal scholarship about sexual orientation and gender identity, see infra
section V.C.L. See also Elizabeth M. Glazer, Essay, Naming's Necessity, 19 LAW & SEXUALrrY 166
(2010) (urging scholars who write about the law as it relates to sexual orientation and gender identity to
consider the words they use to refer to their constituent group).
5. Glee: Blame It on the Alcohol (Fox television broadcast Feb. 22, 2011) (episode summary
available at http://www.fox.com/glee/recaps/season-2/episode- 14/). However, the bisexual story line on
Glee can be understood as a story line about bisexuality as a path to homosexuality. See Lesley
Goldberg, "Glee" Writers: "Santana Is a Lesbian," AFERELLEN (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.afterellen.
com/TV/2011/03/ryan-murphy-says-santana-is-a-lesbian (reporting that writers for the television show
had said about the show's character Santana that "Santana is a lesbian. She might not be ready to come
out yet, but she is," and added that Santana's lesbian sexual orientation was a fact about her character
independent of "[w]hether her [sic] and Brittany will work out").
6. STIEG LARSSON, THE GraR. wrr HE DRAGON TATroO (Reg Keeland trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2010)
(2005) (featuring bisexual protagonist Lisbeth Salander).
7. See Nan Hunter, More Same-Sex Activity or More Honesty About It?, HUNTER OF JUSTICE (Oct. 5,
2010, 12:28 PM), http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com/hunter ofjustice/2010/10/more-same-sex-activityor-more-honest-about-it.htmil (summarizing the findings of the National Survey of Sexual Health and
Behavior, conducted by the Center for Sexual Health Promotion at the School of Health, Physical
Education, and Recreation at Indiana University Bloomington, available at http://www.nationalsexstudy.
indiana.edul).
8. Diane Anderson-Minshall, Ending Bi Erasure-on TV and in Our LGBT Worlds, ADVOCATE.COM
(Sept. 23, 2011,4:20 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/DailyNews/2011/09/23/Ending-BiErasureonTVandinourLGBTWorlds/ (quoting Adrienne Williams of the Bi Social Network).
9. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2011); see also Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic
Alliance, No. C10-0682 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (granting the NAGAAA's motion for partial
summary judgment on injunctive relief on the basis of plaintiffs' (Stephen Apilado, LaRon Charles, and
John Russ) failure to demonstrate a pattern of conduct by the NAGAAA that could establish a sufficient
likelihood of future injury, and denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the basis of
plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate that a compelling state interest in allowing heterosexuals to play
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national gay softball league that disqualified a San Francisco team from the
league's world series because, according to the league, the team's three bisexual
members exceeded the league's rule against having more than two heterosexual
members on a team. Or Perry v. Schwarzenegger,'0 the federal same-sex
marriage case where attorney Ted Olson questioned Sandy Stier, his own client
who had been previously married to a man, on direct examination about how
convinced she was about her gay identity. Olson highlighted a challenge likely
to be leveled against Stier: "Some people might say, 'Well, it's this and then it's
that and it could be this again.' Answer that.""
Despite this hypervisibility, the law has failed to address the harms that
bisexuals face. And those harms are both real and distinct from the harms faced
by gays and lesbians. For example, self-identified bisexuals in the United
Kingdom have reported that they endure more scrutiny about their relationships
from their colleagues at work than do homosexuals, and that this additional
scrutiny has fueled "the perception that bisexuals are ... unstable, unreliable,
and [even] un-promotable."l 2 Moreover, under U.S. immigration law, refugees
seeking asylum have been increasingly required to prove that they are "gay
enough" to deserve it.13
softball on a team within the NAGAAA's league outweighed the interest of the NAGAAA, which the
court classified as an expressive association, to exclude prospective softball players on the basis of their
sexual orientation); see also Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, No. C10-0682, 2011
WL 5563206 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011) (granting the NAGAAA's motion for partial summary
judgment on the basis of plaintiffs' failure to show that the state's interest in eliminating the NAGAAA's exclusionary policies outweighed the NAGAAA's associational rights to maintain a policy
excluding people who choose not to identify as predominantly interested in partnering with members of
the same sex, and denying the NAGAAA's motion to strike the testimony of Russell Robinson, an
expert who offered testimony indicating that the NAGAAA's policy had a disproportionate impact on
men of color because they are less likely to identify as predominantly gay). Ultimately the NAGAAA
settled with Apilado, Charles, and Russ, paying to them an undisclosed fee and "agree[ing] to welcome
an unlimited number of bisexual" (as well as transgender) players into the league in the future. Natalie
Hope McDonald, The Meaning of LGBT in Sports, PHILADELPHIA

MAGAZINE's

G

PHILLY

(Nov. 29, 2011,

10:06 AM), http://blogs.phillymag.com/gphilly/2011/11/29/meaning-lgbt-sports/ (reporting on the settlement of the lawsuit).
10. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating California's Proposition 8 and
asserting that "the right to marry protects an individual's choice of marital partner regardless of
gender"), aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, slip op. at 4-6 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012)
(affirming the unconstitutionality of Proposition 8, but narrowing the grounds for its invalidation); see
also Robert Barnes, California Proposition 8 Same-Sex Marriage Ban Ruled Unconstitutional,WASH.

(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-same-sex-marriage-ban-ruledunconstitutional/2012/02/07/gIQAMNwkwQ-story.html (reporting on the Ninth Circuit's decision).
11. Transcript of Record at 166-67, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 09-2292), available at
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11- 10.pdf.
12. Jane Fae, Survey Finds Different Challenges for Bisexuals, PINK NEws (Oct. 25, 2010), http://
www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/10/25/survey-finds-different-challenges-for-bisexuals/; see also BRENT CHAMPosT

BERLAIN, STONEWALL WORKPLACE GUIDES, BisExuAL PEOPLE IN THE WORKPLACE PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR

2-9 (2009) http://www.stonewall.org.uk/other/startdownload.asp?.openType
documentlD=2017.
EMPLOYERS

forced&

13. See Dan Bilefsky, Gays Seeking Asylum in U.S. Encounter a New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,

2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/nyregion/29asylum.html;

see also Fatma E. Marouf, The

Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a "ParticularSocial Group" and Its Potential
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The problem stems from the law's current definition of "sexual orientation,"
which provides the basis for an actionable discrimination claim. 1 4 This definition includes only extreme orientations like homosexuality and heterosexuality
but, for all practical purposes, excludes bisexuality.' 5 This Article offers an
alternative definition by introducing the distinction between an individual's
General Orientation and Specific Orientation. An individual's General Orientation is the sex' 6 toward which the individual is attracted the majority of the
time. An individual's Specific Orientation is the sex of the individual's desired
or actual partner(s)." Though for many the two orientations are identical, for
bisexuals the two orientations often differ. If adopted-an adoption that would
be modeled on the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'8
to treat discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity as a form of sex

Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & Poi'Y REv. 47,

79-88 (2008). In addition, bisexuals could face harms under immigration law's "sham marriages act" if
they first married a member of the opposite sex before becoming naturalized as citizens and afterwards
entered into a relationship with a member of the same sex. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006).
14. An actionable discrimination claim is predicated upon the individual's fitting within a class
protected by the antidiscrimination statute. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211,
217-18 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that because homosexuals do not comprise a protected class under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), a lesbian plaintiff could not "satisfy
the first element of a prima facie case under Title VII," which requires that a plaintiff be a member of
such a class). Though Title VII itself does not protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, many states' antidiscrimination statutes do. Statewide Employment laws & Policies,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/EmploymentLaws-andPol-

icies.pdf (indicating that in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia it is illegal to discriminate
against someone in employment because of his or her sexual orientation and that the same is true in
sixteen of those states, as well as in D.C., because of a person's gender identity) (last updated Jan. 6,
2012).
15. To be sure, this is not the only instance in which the law understands individuals in binary terms
and, as a result, fails to recognize that these individuals might be better understood along a continuum.
See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving

and Caregivers,94 VA. L. REv. 385 (2008) (arguing that family law should recognize broader networks
of care rather than classifying individuals within that network as either parents or strangers).
16. There are instances in life, law, and this Article in which it is important to differentiate sex from
gender. I do not intend my formulation of the definitions for General and Specific Orientations to be
one such instance. I used the word "sex" because prevailing definitions of sexual orientation, as well as
the literature about bisexuality with which this Article principally engages, also use the word "sex" to
describe individuals' sexual orientations.
17. In this Article, I do not question the monogamy norm, not because I do not believe that the norm
should be questioned, but so that I can isolate the variable of bisexuality for the purpose of analyzing it
here. Moreover, the problem of bisexual invisibility can be explained in part-but not entirely-by a
devotion to the norm of monogamy. But the argument presented in this Article does not depend upon
the governance of a monogamy norm, and I have elsewhere argued against it. See Elizabeth M. Glazer,
Response, Sodomy and Polygamy, 111 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 66 (2011), http://www.columbialaw
review.org/assets/sidebar/volume/l I 1/66Glazer.pdf (arguing that the LGBT rights movement has distanced itself from polygamists for the same reason that it has distanced itself from discussions of sex);
see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Parentsby the Numbers, 37 HoFsrRA L. REv. 11 (2008); Adrienne D.
Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargainingfor Equality, 110 COLUM. L. RaV.
1955 (2010); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Exis-

tence, 29 N.YU. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (2004).
18. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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discrimination-this alternative definition would reorient the concept of sexual
orientation under the law. This sexual reorientation would offer to the LGBT
rights movement, to legislatures, and to courts the opportunity to protect against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as it is actually lived, rather
than on the basis of sexual orientation as the law has until now imagined it to
be. It could also offer to antidiscrimination law a model for the protection of
living identities, with respect to sexual orientation but also with respect to other
identity categories.
The kind of sexual reorientation for which this Article argues potentially
offers one additional payoff. The other kind of sexual reorientation-the kind
that until now was the only kind of sexual reorientation-refers to the controversial practice by some psychotherapists of converting gays and lesbians into
heterosexuals. 2 0 Though this practice has fallen out of favor in the professional
community of psychologists, 2' it persists in other communities.22 The homonymic accident in this Article's title presents an opportunity to note that a
world that embraces the new kind of sexual reorientation would be one in which
the old kind of sexual reorientation would no longer exist. This Article's sexual
reorientation framework aims to reflect the dynamic nature of sexual orientation, in contrast to the static understanding of sexual orientation that operates
particularly strongly for those who support the practice of sexual-reorientation
therapy. The idea that sexual orientation is textured and may change depending
on an individual's specific choice of partner is one that conflicts with the idea

19. Scholars have urged the protection against discrimination on the basis of conduct, in addition to
status, because discrimination occurs not only because of an individual's being a member of a protected
class but also because of the individual's performance of certain traits that are constitutive of class
membership. See, e.g., KENJi YOsINo, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR Civil RiGHTs (2006);
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Mary Anne C.
Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination:A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait
Discriminationas Sex Discrimination:An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEx. L. REv. 167 (2004).
20. For a discussion of the debate about sexual-reorientation therapy, see David B. Cruz, Controlling
Desires: Sexual OrientationConversion and the Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297
(1999).
21. See AM. PSYCHOLOGIcAL Ass'N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTiONs: FOR A BETER UNDERSTANDING OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HoMOsExUALYTY 3 (2008), http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/sorientation.pdf
("All major national mental health organizations have officially expressed concerns about therapies
promoted to modify sexual orientation. To date, there has been no scientifically adequate research to
show that therapy aimed at changing sexual orientation . . . is safe or effective. Furthermore, it seems
likely that the promotion of change therapies reinforces stereotypes and contributes to a negative
climate for lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.").
22. The practice of sexual-reorientation therapy is embraced by certain groups, many of which are
religiously affiliated. See, e.g., JONAH's Suggested Questions for a Prospective Therapist or Counselor, JONAH INTERNATIONAL, http://www.jonahweb.org/sections.phpsecld= 118 (last visited Mar. 12,
2012); Reparative & Other Therapiesfor Homosexuals, RELIGIOUsTOLERANCE.ORG, http://www.religious
tolerance.org/hom repar.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012); Philip M. Sutton, "Do You Do Reparative
Therapy?": The Making of a NARTH Psychologist,NAr'LAss'N FOR RESEARCH & THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, http://www.narth.com/docs/coll-sutton.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
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that sexual orientation can change entirely, as a result of a reformative process.
Of course, those who believe in the practice of sexual-reorientation therapy will
likely continue to believe in it despite this Article's argument for sexual
reorientation. Their inevitable encounter with this Article in a search-enginedriven world leaves this author hoping that they will at least reconsider their
kind of sexual reorientation in light of the kind of sexual reorientation introduced in this Article.
The argument for sexual reorientation proceeds in five parts. Part I explores
the array of definitions for bisexuality and presents evidence of the presence and
proliferation of bisexuals. Part II situates bisexuals within the LGBT rights
movement, likening their treatment to the treatment of the movement's other
excluded group: transgender people.2 3 Part III examines the legal treatment of
bisexuals, explaining the earlier phenomenon of bisexual erasure, current bisexual hypervisibility, and the nature of the legal harms that bisexuals face. Part
IV explains that bisexuals have been excluded politically and legally because of
the potential for their sexual-orientation status to differ from their sexual
conduct, thereby making their identity an uncomfortable moving target. Part V
introduces the concept of sexual reorientation by defining and applying it, and
defends it against objections.2 4
I.

BISEXUALITY AND BISEXUALS

This Article presents a new way of understanding sexual orientation that
reflects the lived experience of human sexuality. At a time when bisexuals seem
to be proliferating, this is particularly important. A 2001 study profiled successful marriages between bisexual men and their wives,25 and a 2002 study
highlighted successful heterosexual marriages between men and bisexual
23. As I have in other work, I employ throughout this Article the following broad and inclusive
definition of the term "transgender," which I borrow from Anna Kirkland:
"gender variant people who have not necessarily sought to alter their bodies but nonetheless
feel a disjunction between their biologically and socially gendered selves," . . . . [which] is
considered broader than, and to include within its definition, the term "transsexual," which
"refer[s] to people who identify as [transsexual] and who seek to alter their physiological
gender status through surgery or hormones in order to bring it into line with their social and
emotional gender status."
Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, TransitionalDiscrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L.
REv. 651, 652 n.8 (2009) (quoting Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A
Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 2 (2003)) (some alterations in
original).
24. A more extensive discussion of additional objections to the framework presented in this Article
appears in a colloquy about this Article, which comprises responses by Colker, Mezey, and Andrew
Koppelman as well as my own surresponse. See Ruth Colker, Response: Hybrid Revisited, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1069 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, Response: Sexual Disorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2012);
Naomi Mezey, Response: The Death of the Bisexual Saboteur, 100 GEO. L.J. 1093 (2012); Elizabeth M.
Glazer, Surresponse:Optimizing Orientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 1105 (2012).
25. See Amity Pierce Buxton, Writing Our Own Script: How Bisexual Men and Their Heterosexual
Wives Maintain Their Marriages After Disclosure, in BisExuALITY IN THE LIVES OF MEN: FACTS AND
FIcnoNs 155 (Brett Beemyn & Erich Steinman eds., 2001).
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women. 2 6 A 2006 New York Magazine article spent a day at Stuyvesant High
School with the "cuddle puddle," a clique of high-school juniors whose members admit sexual attraction to, and sexual experiences with, members of both
sexes. 2 7 According to the updated 2009 edition of The Ethical Slut, the "practical guide to polyamory," "bisexuals have recently begun developing their own
forceful voice and their own communities."2 8
Despite the growing presence of bisexuals-whether erased or hypervisiblethey have. been left to experience discrimination harms without the law's
protection or the support of the political movement that includes them by name.
The goal in putting forward a new definition of sexual orientation is that it be
able to accommodate the continuum of sexual orientation that exists between
the extremes. Before summarizing the findings of several sexuality studies in
section I.B, section L.A explains the axes along which sexual orientation has
been defined: desire, conduct, and self-identification.2 9
A. DEFINING BISEXUALITY

When Yoshino introduced his theory about bisexual erasure, he was careful to
distinguish it as a theory of bisexual erasure rather than a theory of bisexual
nonexistence. 30 For the purpose of his analysis, Yoshino adopted a definition of
bisexuality that was predicated on desire, though he noted that bisexuality,
like other sexual orientations, could be defined along three possible axes: desire,
conduct, and self-identification.3 2 Of course, a particular bisexual might satisfy
the definition of bisexuality along a combination of more than one of these axes
(for example, the self-identifying bisexual who not only desires members of
both sexes but has had sexual experiences with members of both sexes). But it
is important to note that definitions of bisexuality have been offered that rely on
any one of these axes, taken alone.
By using the axis of desire to construct his definition, Yoshino defined the
bisexual as one whose sexual appetite for members of each sex was "more than
incidental," regardless of whether any action had been taken to actualize those
desires.3 The reason he chose to define bisexuality along the axis of desire was
based upon an analogy to how he and others would define homosexuality. He
26. See Regina U. Reinhardt, Bisexual Women in HeterosexualRelationships, in BisEXuAL WOMEN IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 163 (Dawn Atkins ed., 2002).

27. See Alex Morris, The Cuddle Puddle of Stuyvesant High School, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 28, 2006),
http://nymag.com/news/features/15589/.
28. DossiE EASTON & JANET W. HARDY, THE ETHICAL SLUT A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO POLYAMORY, OPEN
RELATIONSHIPS & OTHER ADVENTUREs 33 (2d ed. 2009).

29. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 371.
30. See id. at 361 ("[B]isexual invisibility is not a reflection of the fact that there are fewer bisexuals
than there are homosexuals in the population, but is rather a product of social erasure.").
31. Id. at 373.
32. Id. at 371 (citing EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALrYY SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATEs 290 (1994)).

33. Id.
34. See id. at 373-77.
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explained that the desire-based definition of homosexuality was the one used
most frequently, and moreover that the exclusion of those with homosexual
desires on which they have not acted from the definition of homosexual "for the
purposes of demonstrating erasure [would] be ironic, as it would permit erasure
to control that definition, to let erasure erase itself."35 After all, Yoshino's
"inquiry [was] whether [bisexuals were] forgoing something rather than whether
they should be forgoing it," 36 namely their same-sex desire. And the reason he
qualified in his definition that desire had to be "more than incidental" was in
order to limit the number of people who could fit within his definition. His
theory of bisexual erasure depended on a definition that would include, for
example, men "on the 'down low,' 37 but would not include, for example,
someone who had experienced what 30 Rock character Frank Rossitano experienced with respect to coffee delivery boy Jamie."
Yoshino analyzed a number of conduct-based definitions of bisexuality as
well. 3 9 For example, a definition of bisexuality relying on conduct alone would
include "defense bisexuals," who profess cross-sex desire only to mitigate the
stigma of possessing same-sex desire.40 So-called "ritual bisexuals" or "situational bisexuals" would also fit within a conduct-based definition of bisexuality, because these individuals engaged in same-sex conduct for reasons such as
the initiation into adult status, as in the case of ritual bisexuals, or for financial

35. Id. at 373.
36. Id. at 374.
37. See Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1463 (2009) (profiling the media's
depiction of Black men who are said to live on the down low, meaning that they have "primary
romantic relationships with women" but also engage in "secret sex with men"). To be sure, Robinson
does not take a position on whether men on the down low qualify as homosexual or bisexual and writes
about them as though they could qualify as either homosexual or bisexual. He noted that some men
adopt the identity of being on the down low in lieu of a gay or bisexual identity in order to differentiate
themselves racially (because gay and bisexual identities are often linked with Whiteness), "to assert
their masculinity, and to indicate they are closeted." Id. at 1468 n. 14 (citing KErm BoYIN, BEYOND THE
DowN Low: SEX, LIES, AND DENIAL IN BLACK AMERICA 15-16 (2005)). Robinson also noted that the
account of men on the down low as men who "are thought to be posing as straight but are actually gay"
is problematic because "it denies the existence of genuine bisexuality." Id. at 1487.
38. See 30 Rock: Cougars (NBC television broadcast Nov. 29, 2007) (episode information available
at http://www.nbc.com/30-rocklepisode-guide/season-2/224681/cougars/episode-206/224796/). In this
episode, Rossitano, a heterosexual character, announced to character Liz Lemon, upon seeing twentyyear-old coffee-delivery boy Jamie appear in the office, that he wanted to "hold [Jamie]" and "kiss him
on the mouth." Liz exclaimed to Frank, to voice her disbelief that Frank could feel sexually attracted to
Jamie, "Come on, you read Boobs Magazine!" And Lemon later explained to Frank, upon his
reiteration of his attraction to Jamie, "No, that's not a thing; you can't be gay for just one person, unless
you're a lady and you meet Ellen." At the episode's end, Frank appeared in a scene in a gay dance club
surrounded by men whom the audience was supposed to believe were gay. After dancing with the gay
men in an effort to see whether he was attracted to other men, Frank concluded, "I'm not gay gay; I'm
just gay for Jamie," to which his gay companions responded, "That's not a thing."
39. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 371-73 (quoting and discussing a taxonomy of conduct-based
examples of bisexuality from MAlUoRIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF
EVERYDAY LIFE 30 (1995)).
40. Id. at 372.
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remuneration, as in the case of situational bisexuals. 4 '
Self-identification is the last axis along which Yoshino explained that sexual
orientation is defined. Yoshino argued that defining bisexuality along the axis of
self-identification was problematic because of individuals' reluctance to self-identify
as bisexual.42 For example, Yoshino noted that "'Latin bisexuals' engage in sexual
conduct with both men and women but self-identify as heterosexual" 4 3 because "the
insertive role in certain 'Mediterranean cultures' is not regarded as homosexual, so
that men who participate in same-sex encounters may consider themselves nonetheless heterosexual."4" Yoshino also noted that a definition of bisexuality constructed
along the axis of self-identification would exclude many men "who engage in
extramarital same-sex conduct, or who view their same-sex conduct as 'experimental'
or 'situational' and identify as straight rather than bisexual.4 5 In fact, Coller reported
that in 1995 "[olnly about 1 percent of the adult population identifie[d] as bisexual
[, yet nearly 4 percent acknowledge[d] that they [were] attracted to people of both
sexes."4 Despite individuals' arguable reluctance to self-identify as bisexual, selfidentification has been an important way of defining sexual orientation, not only with
respect to bisexuality. For example, Pat Cain observed that "[s]elf-identified homosexuals surely have an identity apart from their sexual conduct. It is not uncommon for
persons to identify themselves as gay or lesbian before they have engaged in any
sexual conduct." 7 And for (celibate) asexuals, sexual identity may even exclude
sexual conduct altogether and, because these individuals' orientation is predicated on
the absence of desire, rely entirely on self-identification.4 8
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to understand the array of
possible definitions for bisexuality but unimportant to decide on a single
definition for bisexuality. Yoshino, in his article, decided on a desire-based
definition of bisexuality.4 9 In arguing that bisexuals had been erased in a way
that monosexuals had not been, Yoshino reasonably decided on a definition for
bisexuality that was similar to the most common definition of homosexuality.5 0
Further, Yoshino's decision to define bisexuality along the axis of desire was
necessary because any other definition of bisexuality would have undermined
his central thesis-to erase those with bisexual desires from the definition of
bisexuality would "let erasure erase itself."5 ' This Article argues that bisexuals
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 371 (quoting GARBER, supra note 39, at 30).
45. Id. at 372 (citing FRrrz KLEIN, THE BISEXUAL OVrIoN 18 (1978)) (footnote omitted).
46. COLKER, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Trip Gabriel, A New Generation Seems Ready To Give
Bisexuality a Place in the Spectrum, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at C1O).
47. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551,
1625 (1993).
48. On the importance of including asexuals and asexuality in sexuality discourse, see Yoshino,
supra note 3, at 357 n.8.
49. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
51. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 373; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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have experienced discrimination because of their discriminators' discomfort
with general and specific orientations that do not conform to each other. As a
result, this Article's central thesis depends only on that nonconformity and is
therefore equally applicable to any possible definition of bisexuality (and for
that matter, any possible definition of other sexual orientations).
B. THE PRESENCE AND PROLIFERATION OF BISEXUALS

Scholars in other disciplines52 began studying sexuality well before legal
scholars began writing about sexual orientation and the law.5 3 As will be
discussed further below, the important thing to remember about the numerous
sexuality studies conducted over the past fifty years is that each of them found
that the incidence of nonexclusive orientation toward members of the same sex
was "greater than or comparable to the incidence of homosexuality." 54 Moreover, each of them defined sexual orientation along some combination of the
three axes conventionally used to do So.55 Though others besides Alfred Kinsey
studied human sexuality, Kinsey's studies of male and female sexual behaviorwhile not without critics56-are still "the most ...

widely cited research on

52. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHOFIELD, SoCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THREE TYPES OF HOMOsEXuALS (1965); C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIx (2d ed. 1975).

53. The first law-review article to offer a systematic account of the legal treatment of homosexuals
was Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the

United States, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 799 (1979).
54. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 386; see also infra note 89 and accompanying text.
55. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 382-85 (describing the following studies of human sexuality:
ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MATIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
639-41 (1948) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., MALE], and ALFRED C. KINsEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE
E. MARTIN & PAUL H. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 471-72 (1953) [hereinafter
KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE] (defining sexual orientation according to a combination of desire and conduct by
testing subjects for "psychosexual response" (desire) and "overt sexual experience" (conduct) and

creating the "Kinsey scale," which assessed sexual orientation along a continuum from 0 to 6, where 0
denoted an orientation with exclusively heterosexual contacts, 6 denoted an orientation with exclusively
homosexual contacts, and 1 through 5 denoted orientations ranging from more heterosexual to more
homosexual though not exclusively one or the other); SAMUEL S. JANUS & CYNTHIA L. JANUS, THE JANUS
REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 70 (1993) (reporting a slightly higher incidence of bisexuality based on
self-identification only); LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 32, at 311 (asking a set of questions that addressed

participants' desire, conduct, and self-identification, and finding that the bisexual incidence was greater
than or comparable to the monosexual incidence); WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON,
HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 8, 14-15 (1979) (studying those who would have been classified
according to the Kinsey scale as Kinsey Is through Kinsey 6s and thus defining sexual orientation
according to a combination of desire and conduct, though arguably employing a definition of sexual
orientation more heavily conduct-based than Kinsey because individuals who qualified as Kinsey Is
"were accepted into the study only if they could document that they were currently living in a
homosexual relationship of at least three months' duration"); KAYE WELLINGS, JULIA FIELD, ANNE
JOHNSON & JANE WADSWORTH, SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR IN BRITAIN: THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF SEXUAL ATITUDES

AND LIFESTYLES 181, 183 (1994) (disaggregating desire from conduct in order to define and document
the incidence of bisexuality, and finding that the incidence of bisexuality was greater than or compa-

rable to that of monosexuality whether assessed on the basis of desire (attraction, according to the
study) or conduct (experience, according to the study))).
56. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. COCHRAN ET AL., STATISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE KINSEY REPORT ON SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR INTHE HUMAN MALE (1954).
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sexuality in the United States."
Alfred Kinsey founded the modem field of human sexuality studies. His chief
innovation was the "Kinsey scale," which assessed sexual orientation along a continuum from 0 to 6, where 0 denoted an orientation with exclusively heterosexual
contacts and 6 denoted an orientation with exclusively homosexual contacts, and 1
through 5 denoted shades of gray between exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive
homosexuality.5 9 By assessing orientation along the scale, Kinsey and his associates
found that among males, only 50% were exclusively heterosexual throughout their
adult lives and 4% were exclusively homosexual, meaning that 46% of men either
had sexual experiences with both men and women or desired both men and women.6
Among women, they found that "[b]y the age of forty, 28% of women had responded
erotically to other women psychologically and 19% had had overt sexual experiences
with other women." 61 These were startling findings in a world where sexual orientation had been grouped into the two discrete monosexual categories. Perhaps equally
as startling, using the Kinsey scale-which combined elements of desire and conductKinsey and his associates found that "25 percent of the male population had more
than incidental homosexual experience or reactions (i.e., rated from 2-6) for at least
three years between the ages of 16 and 55,"62 while "10 percent of the males [were]
more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rated 5 or 6) for at least three years between
the ages of 16 and 55,"63 thus leaving 15% of the male population between the ages
of 16 and 55 that had had nonexclusive homosexual experiences compared with 10%
that had had exclusive homosexual experiences.6 For women, Kinsey and his associates found that "an average of ten percent of unmarried females and 2.5 percent of
married females rated from 2 to 6 'in each of the years between twenty and thirty-five
years of age,"' 6 5 figures that contrast with the "average of four percent of unmarried
females and less than one percent of married females [who] rated 5 or 6 'in each of
the years between twenty and thirty-five years of age"'" and which leave "six percent
of unmarried women and more than 1.5 percent of married women" that had had
nonexclusive homosexual experiences compared with "four percent of unmarried
women and less than one percent of married women" that had had exclusive homosexual experiences.67 Thus, for both men and women within these time and age
restrictions, Kinsey and his associates found a higher incidence of nonexclusive

57. Mezey, supra note 2, at 104.
58. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 380 ("Begin at the beginning, with Alfred Kinsey's foundational

studies of sexual behavior in the human male and female." (footnotes omitted)).
59. KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 55, at 639-41 .

60. Id. at 656.
61. Mezey, supra note 2, at 104 (citing KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 55, at 452).
62. KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 55, at 650.
63. Id. at 651.

64. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 381.
65. Id. at 381 (quoting KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 55, at 473).
66. Id. at 381-82 (quoting

67. Id. at 382.

KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE,

supra note 55, at 473-74).
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homosexual behavior than exclusive homosexual behavior.
Of course, Kinsey's was not the only study of human sexuality. Yoshino
summarized the findings of Kinsey's study as well as those of four other studies
that were conducted after Kinsey's, which all included "data sufficient to permit
a comparison of the relative incidences of bisexuals and homosexuals in the
population." 6 9 The first of these other studies was conducted by Masters and
Johnson, who in 1979 conducted a study of those whom they and their researchers deemed to fall on Kinsey's scale as is through 6s, excluding from their
study those deemed to fall on Kinsey's scale as Os as well as Kinsey 1
representatives who could not document that they were living in a homosexual
relationship of at least three months' duration. 70 According to Kinsey, "[i]ndividuals are rated as 1's if their psychosexual responses and/or overt experience are
directed almost entirely toward individuals of the opposite sex, although they
incidentally make psychosexual responses to their own sex, and/or have incidental sexual contacts with individuals of their own sex."7 Masters and Johnson's
additional requirement for Kinsey 1 representatives caused Yoshino to observe
that these individuals would likely not have qualified as Kinsey Is in Kinsey's
own study and that the Masters & Johnson study likely underreported the
number of bisexuals as a result.72 Nevertheless, Yoshino interpreted the Masters
and Johnson study to have concluded that its data pool was comprised of 46.8%
male bisexuals compared to 48.9% male homosexuals and 59.8% female bisexuals compared to 36.6% female homosexuals.7 3 As Yoshino observed, "the ratio
of bisexual men to gay men was lower than that in the Kinsey study, [but] the
study still found that bisexual men existed in comparable numbers to gay
men ... [a]nd [that] the ratio of bisexual women to lesbians was greater than
that found in the Kinsey study." 7 4
The 1993 study by Cynthia and Samuel Janus relied on individuals' selfidentification in order to classify them by their sexual orientation.75 Nevertheless, the study reported a roughly one-to-one ratio of bisexuals to homosexuals
for both men and women, but also suggested that there may have been underreporting of bisexuality.7 6 Yoshino also reported on the findings in a 1994 study of

68. See id.
69. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 379. Yoshino examined these five studies (Kinsey's plus four other
studies) instead of a total of nine studies on human sexuality that had been conducted at the time that he
wrote his article. Id. at 378-79 (explaining his rationale for omitting discussion of a study conducted by
Playboy magazine, as well as the following studies: SHERE HIE, THE HIE REPORTr- A NATIONWIDE STUDY
OF FEMALE SEXUALITY (1976); ALFRED SpIRA, NATHALIE BAJos & ACSF GROUP, SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR AND
AIDS (1994); CAROL TAvIUs & SUSAN SADD,

THE REDBOOK

REPORT ON FEMALE SEXUALITY (1975)).

70. See MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 55, at 14-15.
71. KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 55, at 471.

72. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 382.
73. Id. (citing MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 55, at 29, 32).
74. Id. at 382-83.
75. See JANUS & JANUS, supra note 55, at 70-71.

76. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 383 (citing JANUS & JANUS, supra note 55, at 70).
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sexual behavior in Britain.77 The Wellings study used a five-point scale-which
Yoshino numbered from 0 to 4, where 0 denoted only heterosexual attraction
and/or experience and 4 denoted only homosexual attraction and/or experienceand sought to ascertain sexual attraction as well as sexual experience. The
study defined sexual experience as "'any kind of contact with another person
that [the subject] felt was sexual,' including 'kissing or touching, or intercourse
or any other form of sex."' 79 The study did not define sexual attraction. 0 The
Wellings study found that bisexuals existed in numbers greater than or comparable to those of homosexuals. 8 I Lastly, Yoshino reported on the findings in a
1994 study in which subjects were asked to complete the phrase, "In general,
are you sexually attracted to . . ." with one of five responses: "[1] only men, [2]
mostly men, [3] both men and women, [4] mostly women, [or] [5] only
women[.]" 8 2 Here, again, Yoshino reported that "the percentages of 'bisexuals'
[were] again greater than or comparable to those of 'homosexuals.'" 83
Since Yoshino wrote his article, there have been other studies of human sexuality.
For example, a 2010 national sex survey conducted by Indiana University reported
that of the 7% of the population identifying as nonheterosexual, 40% of the men and a
large majority of the women surveyed identified as bisexual.m In addition, in 2011,
researchers at Northwestern University reported that they had found evidence that at
least some men who identify themselves as bisexual are, in fact, sexually aroused by
both men and women, evidence contradicting a 2005 study also conducted by
researchers at Northwestern reporting that "'with respect to sexual arousal and attraction, it remains to be shown that male bisexuality exists.'" 85 Participants in the 2011
study (all men, as in the 2005 study) were required "to have had sexual experiences

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 383-84 (reporting on WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 55).
Id.
Id. at 383 (quoting WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 55, at 181) (alterations in original).
Id. (citing WELLINGS ETAL., supra note 55, at 181).

81. Id. at 384 & n.170 (explaining in further detail the study's methodology and results).
82. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 32, at 658.

83. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 385 (explaining in further detail the Laumann study's methodology and
results, and referring to either sexual-orientation category in quotation marks to indicate a possible
difference between how Yoshino's own desire-based definition of these categories might have applied

to the subjects, and those whom the Laumann study would have designated as either bisexual or
homosexual).
84. See CTR. FOR SEXUAL HEALTH PROMOTION, SCH. OF HEALTH, PHYSICAL EDUC., & RECREATION, IND.
UNtv. BLOOMINGTON,

NATIONAL SURVEY

OF SEXUAL HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR, available at http://

www.nationalsexstudy.indiana.edu/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
85. David Tuller, No Surprisefor Bisexual Men: Report Indicates They Exist, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 22,

2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/health/23bisexual.html (quoting Gerulf Rieger, Meredith L.
Chivers & J. Michael Bailey, Sexual Arousal Patterns of Bisexual Men, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 579, 582

(2005), and discussing A.M. Rosenthal, D. Sylva, A. Safron & J.M. Bailey, Sexual Arousal Patterns of
Bisexual Men Revisited, 88 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 112 (2011)). It should be noted that the 2011 study

was financed in part by the American Institute of Bisexuality. Id. The 2005 study had perpetuated a
belief that bisexuality in men did not exist. See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1488 & n.112 (citing
Benedict Carey, Straight, Gay or Lying? Bisexuality Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at Fl

(describing the findings of the 2005 study, which have been subsequently contradicted by the findings
of the 2011 study)).
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with at least two people of each sex and a romantic relationship of at least three
months with at least one person of each sex," whereas men who had participated in
the 2005 study had been "recruited through advertisements in gay-oriented and
alternative publications and were identified as heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual
based on responses to a standard questionnaire.'6 In both the 2005 and 2011 studies,
"men watched videos of male and female same-sex intimacy while genital sensors
monitored their erectile responses." 87 Whereas the 2005 study "reported that the
bisexuals generally resembled homosexuals in their responses" to the videos, the 2011
study found that the "bisexual men responded to both the male and female videos"
while homosexual and heterosexual men studied did not.8"
Yoshino observed, with respect to the five studies that he analyzed, that "each
... found that the incidence of bisexuality was greater than or comparable to
the incidence of homosexuality."89 The studies conducted since Yoshino wrote
his article have continued to demonstrate such an incidence of that which
Yoshino would have defined as bisexuality (and that which would qualify as
nonexclusive orientation toward members of the same sex whether or not one
adopts Yoshino's definition of bisexuality) as compared with homosexuality.
Moreover, the "unusual scientific about-face" 90 that occurred between the 2005
study and the 2011 study conducted by researchers at Northwestern University
provides even stronger support for the prevalence of bisexuality.
II.

A MOvEMErT ABOUT DIFFERENCE BUT DEPENDENT

ON SAMENESS

Much has changed since the time that Yoshino and others addressed the problem of
bisexual invisibility.91 Sodomy laws have been held unconstitutional. 2 The military's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law (DADT) has been repealed.93 President Obama publicly
renounced the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and refused
to defend it in court. 4 Same-sex marriage is legal in seven states and in the District of
Columbia 9 5 -certainly far from a majority, but an incremental victory nonetheless.9
86. Tuller, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 380.
90. Tuller, supra note 85.
91. See supranotes 1-3 and accompanying text.
92. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
93. Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Under DADT, a
service member stating "that he or she [was] a homosexual or bisexual" would be separated from the
armed forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2006).
94. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen. of the U.S., to The Honorable John A. Boehner,

Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-223.html (reporting that the President had determined that Section 3 of DOMA, "as
applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment," and that the Attorney General would no longer instruct Department of Justice attorneys to defend it in pending cases).
95. As this article goes to print, same-sex marriage is legally recognized in California, Connecticut,

Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont, as well as in the District of Columbia.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8's ban on
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Some states have adopted antidiscrimination statutes that protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the employment" and public accommodations9 contexts.
This generation's civil rights struggle 9 9 has improved dramatically since
Rhonda Rivera examined the legal treatment of gays and lesbians in the United
States just over thirty years ago. 100 Law libraries are different places than they
were when Bill Rubenstein, as a student at Harvard Law School, spent an
evening going "[u]p and down the cavernous corridors and through the labyrinth of stacks[, finding] no casebooks, no hornbooks, no treatises, no black
letter guides, no practice pointers . . . about [his] life." 0 1 Since then, the law has

recognized the social problem of discrimination against gays and lesbians, and
has offered some legal resolution to it.

same-sex marriage in California unconstitutional "under both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses"), aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, slip op. at 4-6 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012)
(affirming the unconstitutionality of Proposition 8, but narrowing the grounds for its invalidation);
Kerrigan v. Comn'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411-12 (Conn. 2008) (holding that a state statutory
prohibition against same-sex marriage impermissibly discriminated against gay people on account of
their sexual orientation, in violation of Connecticut's constitution); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862,
872 (Iowa 2009) (holding a provision of the Iowa Code prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause of Iowa's constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating a Massachusetts law prohibiting same-sex
couples from "the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage"); Michael Barbaro, After
Long Wait, Same-Sex Couples Marry in New York, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/25/nyregion/after-long-wait-same-sex-couples-marry-in-new-york.html (describing people's activities on the first day on which same-sex couples could legally marry in New York, following the June
2011 passage of same-sex marriage legislation); Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes SameSex Marriage, N.Y TIMEs (June 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04mariage.html
("The New Hampshire legislature [and Governor] approved revisions to a same-sex marriage bill ...
making the state the sixth to let gay couples wed."); Nikita Stewart & Tim Craig, D.C. Council Votes To
Recognize Gay Nuptials Elsewhere, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al ("[Y]esterday .. . Vermont became
the fourth state to recognize same-sex marriages . . . ."); Ian Urbina, Gay Marriage Is Legal in U.S.
Capital,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/us/04marriage.html (reporting
on D.C.'s legalization of same-sex marriage, and the law's having "survived Congressional attempts to
block it").
96. Bill Eskridge has argued that the path to legally recognizing same-sex marriage should be
"step-by-step and incremental," so perhaps an incremental victory is all that should be desired. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Essay, ComparativeLaw and the Same-Sex MarriageDebate: A Step-by-Step
Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 641, 647 (2000).
97. See Statewide Employment Laws & Policies,supra note 14.
98. E.g., ME. REv. STxr ANN. tit. 5, § 4591 (2002 & Supp. 2011) ("The opportunity for every

individual to have equal access to places of public accomodation without discrimination because of .. .
sexual orientation . . . is recognized as and declared to be a civil right."); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West
2002 & Supp. 2011) ("All persons shall have the opportunity ... to obtain all the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimination
because of . .. affectional or sexual orientation . . . .").
99. See David Vines, Our Generation's Defining Struggle, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2009,
10:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vines/our-generations-defining b_31563.6.html
("Whether we like it or not, the fight for gay rights will be our struggle.").
100. Rivera, supra note 53.
101. William B. Rubenstein, Essay, My HarvardLaw School, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 317, 318
(2004).
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But success has come at a cost. In order to achieve victories, advocates for
gays and lesbians have tried to argue that but for gays' and lesbians' differences,
they are just like everybody else. 1 0 2 Their strategy is not unreasonable. The
Aristotelian insight that likes should be treated alike is a powerful one and has
had a profound impact not only on the efforts of LGBT rights advocates, but
also for antidiscrimination efforts more broadly.10 3 The cause lawyer who wants
to win civil rights on behalf of a group that includes her client would thus be
well-advised to choose a client whose only difference is the possession of the
characteristic that formed the basis of his alleged discrimination.'" Otherwise,
the task of proving that her client suffered discrimination because of his
possession of the characteristic in question becomes increasingly difficult.' 0 5
Thus, the successes of gays, lesbians, and other minorities have been predicated
on the similarity of these individuals in comparison with the majority of the
population, as opposed to the differences that have caused members of the
majority to discriminate against them.
A focus on the extent to which gays and lesbians are just like everybody else
helps to explain the regrettably fractured state of the current LGBT rights
political movement, which is elaborated in section II.A. Section II.B explains
more particularly that the movement, because of its commitment to representing
only those who do not challenge the similarity between its constituents and
those who discriminate against them, has become a movement that protects
those who are, for all practical purposes, "straight but for the fact that they're
gay." Finally, section II.C revisits the initial debate about litigating difference in
sexual-orientation law, which arose in connection with sodomy litigation.
A. FRAGMENTATION WITHIN THE LGBT RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Scholars such as Katherine Franke, Nancy Levit, and Marc Spindelman have
observed that the pragmatic strategy for lawyers litigating for LGBT rights has
been to use the "'homo kinship' model or 'like straight' logic to argue for
parental rights or same-sex marriage." 10 6 As a result, in securing victories,

102. See Mary Anne Case, Commentary, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1664 (1993) ("This
may be one reason why ... the court may have felt less threatened by this couple-they were blending
in, behaving 'just like everybody else."').
103. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 743 (2011)
(citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN Emcs 113 1a-b (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962)

(c. 384 B.C.E.)).
104. For more on the theory, ethics, and practice of cause lawyering, see CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLMCAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILYTIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,

1998).
105. See Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23, at 661 ("In order to articulate a discrimination claim
under Title VII, plaintiffs must satisfy the statute's causation requirement, meaning that plaintiffs must

claim that the discrimination suffered was 'because of' their membership in a particular protected
category.").
106. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 CoLuM. J. GENDER &
L. 21, 23 (2010) (relying on, inter alia, Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force et al., Make Change, Not
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LGBT rights advocates have "intentionally le[ft] parts of the community behind."10 7 The recent exclusion of transgender people from successive drafts of
the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), 0 8 on the theory that their
inclusion would prevent ENDA's eventual passage, provides a notable example.
This exclusion caused sharp division among LGBT rights advocates. In particular, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) infamously supported a noninclusive
ENDA, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but
not on the basis of gender identity, because HRC concluded that a more
inclusive ENDA would not pass out of the House of Representatives. 1 09 HRC
received a lot of criticism for its position on ENDA,"1 o which it later reversed,
explaining that its earlier opposition to a trans-inclusive ENDA "would [have
done] more to advance inclusive legislation.""' Public support for a transinclusive ENDA ultimately brought about support among LGBT rights advocates for a version of ENDA that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity, which describes the latest versions of the
Lawsuits, http://www.thetaskforceactionfund.org/take action/guides/change not lawsuits.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2011), which urged strategic lawsuits); see also Katherine M. Franke, Essay, The Politics
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (expressing concern that

"the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay rights movement has now become 'the couple"'); Marc
Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1368-75 (2005) (explaining the success of
"like straight" arguments in Goodridge v. Departmentof PublicHealth, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
107. Levit, supra note 106, at 22 & n.6 (citing Cynthia Laird, Tense Meeting with HRC over ENDA,
BAY AREA REPORTER

(Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=2589,

and Transgender Inclusion May Spell Trouble for ENDA,

WORKPLACE PROF

BLoG (Oct. 3, 2007),

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2007/10/trangender-incl.html).
108. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1705, 108th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (2003)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but not gender identity);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (2007) (same); see also
Recent Proposed Legislation, Employment Discrimination-CongressConsiders Bill To ProhibitEmployment Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientationand Gender Identity-Employment NondiscriminationAct of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), 123 HARv. L. REv. 1803, 1806 n.23 (2010) (noting
history of ENDA and citing Jill D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of PerceivedSexual
Orientationand Gender Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct, 44 U.S.F. L.

REV. 1, 9-12 (2009)).
109. See Laird, supra note 107 ("While HRC had previously gone on record as supporting only an
ENDA that included both sexual orientation and gender identity protections, it abandoned that position
once . . . lawmakers on Capitol Hill determined there were not enough votes for the inclusive ENDA to
pass out of the House of Representatives.").
110. See Eliza Gray, Transitions: What Will It Take for America To Accept TransgenderPeople for
Who They Really Are?, THE NEw REPUBLIC (June 23, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/

90519/transgender-civil-rights-gay-lesbian-lgbtq (describing HRC's lack of support for ENDA's protection against discrimination on the basis of gender identity and remarking that "there was no question
that the ENDA debate had exposed a rift" between those who support rights for transgender people and
those arguing for gay rights); Jeremy Hooper, HRC T's Up for More Peaceful ENDA Discourse, GOOD
AS YOU (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.goodasyou.org/good-asyou/2009/03/hrc-ts-up-for-more-peace-endadiscourse.html ("Remember in 2007, when their failure to oppose a non-inclusive ENDA led many
LGBT activists to Harangue/Ridiculue [sic]/Challenge HRC? Well happily, the future seems more
Hopeful Regarding Cooperation on passing an inclusive measure. . . .").
111. HRC Finally Ready To Back Trans-Inclusive ENDA, QUEERTY (Mar. 26, 2009), http://
www.queerty.com/hrc-finally-ready-to-back-trans-inclusive-enda-20090326/ (quoting HRC) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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bill as they were introduced last spring: if enacted into law, the most recent
version of ENDA' 1 2 "would prohibit the states, as well as other employers,
from discriminating against their employees on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity."' 1 3
Agreement among key players in the LGBT rights movement on the need to
include transgender protection in ENDA has not meant that the interests of
transgender people have been fully integrated into the LGBT rights movement's
goals. But litigation" 4 and some scholarly attention (including my own),"' 5 as
well as the political attention that the ENDA debate attracted, have heightened
the collective sensitivity to the harms that transgender people face. The exclusion of bisexuals has received far less attention.
B. THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WHO ARE STRAIGHT, BUT FOR THE FACT THAT THEY'RE GAY

Transgender and bisexual people have been excluded from the movement's
efforts and, therefore, have not benefited from its recent victories.' 6 Operating
on the homo-kinship model, advocates who have fought for rights on behalf of
gays and lesbians have tried their best to make gays and lesbians appear as
"normal" as possible." Neither transgender nor bisexual people appear normal,
112. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. § 2(2) (2011) (introduced
by Senator Jeff Merkley on April 13, 2011); H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. § 2(2) (2011) (introduced by
Representative Barney Frank on April 6, 2011).
113. Recent Proposed Legislation, supra note 108, at 1803 (analyzing the 2009 version of ENDA,
which, like the 2011 version, included transgender people within the scope of its protection).
114. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that transgender
plaintiff Jimmie Smith could state an actionable claim for discrimination under Title VII); Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming Smith on the same grounds for
discrimination against transgender plaintiff Philecia Barnes); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,
1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding, in a case involving transgender plaintiff Karen Ulane, that Title
VII's prohibition against "sex" discrimination did not cover discrimination based on gender identity);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296-99, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that Diane Schroer
experienced discrimination in violation of Title VII, when her potential employer rescinded her job
offer after Schroer told her potential employer she was transitioning from male to female).
115. See, e.g., TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); Taylor Flynn, Essay, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need To Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392 (2001); Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer,

Trans Fat (Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-11 / Penn State Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 08-2009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1337129;
Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23; Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18

BERKELEY

L.J. 15 (2003).
116. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
117. Some scholars have argued against the emphasis on sameness in this movement. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NoRMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETICs OF QUEER LIFE 41-52,
65-66 (1999) (explaining the tendency to desexualize the gay rights movement in order to demonstrate
homosexuals' similarity to heterosexuals); Cain, supra note 47, at 1582, 1615-16, 1640-41 (arguingbefore sodomy laws were held unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)-that
litigators for gay and lesbian rights should resist legal theories bifurcating sexual conduct from sexualorientation status, despite the appeal of such theories in light of the Court's decision, in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to uphold the sodomy statute then applicable in Georgia (when the
issue before the Court was what level of scrutiny should be applied to privacy claims regarding intimate
sexual conduct between same-sex couples), because a legal theory predicated on this bifurcation
WoMEN's
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if appearance as normal depends upon the extent to which an individual is
similar to a heterosexual. 1 8 Transgender people challenge the pervasive gender
binary, adherence to which is necessary for an individual's normalcy. 1 9 Bisexual people challenge the pervasive sexual-orientation binary that "contemporary American society ... insist[s] on." 1 2 0 Individuals, thus, seem to qualify as
normal to the extent they adhere strictly to a binary, which neither transgender
people nor bisexuals do.
Transgender and bisexual people are minorities among minorities. Their
identities overlap to a certain extent with those of gays and lesbians but at times
diverge. The debate over a trans-inclusive ENDA provided an opportunity for
the LGBT rights movement to clarify its commitment to civil rights for people
who are transgender.121 But bisexuals continue to be left behind. Bisexuals are,
at least in name, a part of the LGBT rights movement-arguably, however, in
name only. In addition to their exclusion from the legal definition of "sexual
orientation," bisexuals have been excluded from the movement's efforts to
protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Part of the reason for bisexual exclusion may relate to persistent myths about
bisexuals, which seem to be popular amongst both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Yoshino mentioned "the stereotype of bisexuals as 'greedy' or 'promiscuous' and explained that the implication of such a stereotype was that "bisexuals
[ask] for more than their due," 1 2 2 because an individual's "due" is to be
attracted to only one sex, and really (because of the prominence of the norm of
monogamy) only one person. He also mentioned that heterosexuals and homosexuals, in some cases, believed different stereotypes about bisexuals. For
example, he observed that "[clommon straight stereotypes of bisexuals portray[ed] them as promiscuous, as duplicitous, as closeted, and especially as
bridges for HIV infection from the 'high risk' gay population to the 'low risk'

"would have been useless to [the] goals" of the earlier movement for gay rights, goals such as sexual
freedom and gay liberation as opposed to the "more conservative concept of 'gay rights"'); Edward
Stein, Evaluating the Sex DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REv. 471,

496-505 (2001) (arguing that sexual orientation should not be characterized as sex discrimination
because doing so misstates the harm). Others have argued that, as a litigation strategy, emphasizing
similarities is essential. See, e.g., ANDREw SULLIVAN, VrruALLY NoRMaL: AN ARGUMENT ABoUT HoMosExUArry (Vintage Books 1996) (1995); Andrew Koppelman, Reply, Defending the Sex Discrimination
Argumentfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REv. 519, 532-34 (2001)

(explaining that, despite the fact that doing so might exclude certain facts about sexual-orientation
discrimination, those facts are irrelevant to the law's disposition of sexual-orientation discrimination,
which Koppelman argues should be framed as sex discrimination).
118. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the homo-kinship model that has
dictated the strategy of litigating on behalf of LGBT rights).
119. See, e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision

Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265 (1999) (discussing the law's commitment to the sex
and gender binaries in exploring the legal treatment of intersex individuals).
120. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 356 (footnotes omitted).
121. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
122. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 374.

1018

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 100:997

straight population."' 2 3 This particular stereotype has become increasingly popular with the uncovering of men-and in particular, Black men-"who are said
to live on the 'down low' . . . in that they have primary romantic relationships
with women while engaging in secret sex with men."l24
Yoshino observed that homosexuals, too, attach to bisexuals a stigma "by
characterizing individuals who self-describe as bisexual as going through a
'phase' that will end in monosexuality," leading homosexuals "to be suspicious
of those who claim bisexuality as a stable identity." 25 Sean Cahill, director of
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, acknowledged these
misconceptions about bisexuals when he wrote that, "[c]ontrary to common
misconceptions, bisexuality is not the equivalent of sexual promiscuity," and
"[a]lso contrary to misconceptions, bisexuality is not a transitional phase between heterosexuality and homosexuality." 12 6 But these myths seem to prevail,
and seem to have prompted the "cute blonde girl" who "saved" bisexual author
Maria Burnham from exclusion at the "very first all-lesbian shindig" that she
attended during the summer of 2009 to advise Burnham to "[c]laim gay" if
Burnham "like[d] a dyke" because "most lesbians are not ... cool with bi girls"
because, according to the blonde, lesbians "think they can't trust [bisexuals],
that [bisexuals will] turn on them if the right guy comes along, that [bisexuals
are] not serious."l 2 7 The prevalence of myths about bisexuality can explain not
only the prescription to shy away from identifying as bisexual at a lesbian party
but also the fact that lawyers have not, until very recently,12 8 brought suit on
behalf of bisexual plaintiffs.
Transgender people have certainly been excluded, too. The exclusion of
bisexuals is both similar to and different from the exclusion of transgender
people from the LGBT rights movement. Including the interests of transgender
people is different from including the interests of bisexuals because transgender
discrimination does not constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but instead discrimination on the basis of gender identity. Sexual orientation and gender identity are certainly related.129 But the exclusion of bisexuals

123. Id. at 396 (citing Robin Ochs, Biphobia: It Goes More than Two Ways, in BISEXUALITY" THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITCS OF AN INVISIBLE MINORITY 217, 227 (Beth A. Firestein ed., 1996)).
124. Robinson, supra note 37, at 1464.
125. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 398.
126. Sean Cahill, Bisexuality: Dispelling the Myths, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/BisexualityDispellingtheMyths.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2011).
127. Maria Burnham, Being Bi in a Gay World, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (Dec. 20, 2011, 2:17 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-burnham/being-bi-in-a-gay-worldb_1 156628.html.
128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
129. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAUF. L. REV. 1
(1995) (deconstructing and critiquing the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation over time and
across borders); see also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 187, 196 (arguing that "the censure of homosexuality cannot be animated merely by a
condemnation of sexual behavior," and that "[i]nstead, homosexuality is censured because it violates
the prescriptions of gender role expectations").
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from the LGBT rights movement stems from a desire on the part of LGBT
rights advocates to protect individuals whose sexual orientation adheres to the
sexual-orientation binary as much as possible, whereas bisexuality challenges
the very existence of this binary.
The homo-kinship model has dictated, for example, that LGBT rights lawyers
should litigate cases in states where residents are more likely to agree that gays
and lesbians should have the right to marry. It has also dictated that lawyers
arguing for LGBT rights should treat their cases like controlled experiments;
only one factor-their clients' sexual preference for members of the same
sex-differentiates their clients from everybody else. This way, it is more likely
that the lawyer will be able to demonstrate that an individual was discriminated
against because of her sexual orientation, and that the individual would not have
been discriminated against but for her sexual orientation.13 0
This strategy is predicated on the required elements for an actionable discrimination claim. Under what Suzanne Goldberg has recently identified as the
comparator model of discrimination law, courts will only rule that discrimination has occurred if, for example, "an employer has two employees who are
similar but for X characteristic, and the employer treats Employee X worse than
Employee Not-X," because "we are generally comfortable inferring that X is the
basis, or cause, for the different treatment."13 1 In order for the comparator
model to work-not only in the operation of statutes like Title VII but in other
contexts in which discrimination is alleged-someone must exist against whom
to compare the person who experienced discrimination. That person must be
just like the person who experienced discrimination, but for the characteristic
that supposedly caused the discrimination.
In light of the comparator aspect to antidiscrimination law, the homo-kinship
model is a strategy reasonably employed. What is objectionable, however, is
that this strategy has dictated the exclusion of individuals who should be
included in the movement's efforts, because their inclusion is not strategic.
Bisexuals are not straight enough to be gay. In order that LGBT advocates can
demonstrate that protected individuals experienced discrimination because of
their homosexuality, they tend to protect only those who are straight, butfor the
fact that they are gay.
C. AN EARLIER DEBATE ABOUT DIFFERENCE

The issue of whether to include bisexuals or transgender people within the
LGBT rights movement is related to an issue that was the subject of earlier
debate among scholars of sexual-orientation law. In 1993, Mary Anne Case
engaged Janet Halley and Pat Cain in a debate about the extent to which
lawyers arguing against the constitutionality of sodomy statutes should emphasize the details of gay and lesbian sex. Case argued that doing so would lessen
130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
131. Goldberg, supra note 103, at 744.
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the opportunity for success in the arena of gay and lesbian rights. Halley and
Cain argued that doing so would promote the purpose of the gay and lesbian
rights movement.
Halley and Cain both argued that gay rights advocates should focus on the
details of individuals' sexual activity. Halley's goal was to create "alliances
along the register of acts" instead of along the register of identities.13 2 She
argued that an act-based alliance among individuals would highlight that sodomy, prohibitions against which had not yet been held unconstitutional at the
time she wrote, was an activity in which not only homosexuals but also
heterosexuals engaged.1 3 3 By creating an "alliance of sodomites," Halley hoped
to "undermine[] [heterosexual identity] from within," which would-in her
estimation-end the metonymy of sodomy and homosexuality. 3 4
Cain reconstructed the history of litigating for lesbian and gay rights, telling a
story that demonstrated that it was the "hostility toward 'difference' [that]
prevented the formation of any widespread gay or lesbian movement against
anti-gay discrimination."1 35 Cain lamented a "general shift in the movement
away from the original concept of 'gay liberation,' towards a more conservative
concept of 'gay rights."' 1 3 6 By "gay liberation," Cain meant "a commitment to
the deconstruction of the categories homosexual and heterosexual as those
categories ha[d] been constructed by dominant forces in society." 1 3 7
Cain shared Halley's concern that sodomy had become a metonym for
homosexuality. In order to end this metonymy, Cain argued for a distinction
between proven conduct and presumed conduct along with a directive to "those
who litigate on behalf of gay men and lesbians to focus the court's attention on
the details of the conduct their clients have engaged in."1 3 8 She urged gay rights
advocates to use substantive due process arguments because they "would allow
us (lesbians and gay men) to argue independently about the value of intimate
association, construction of self through relationship, and the authenticity of
lesbian and gay love. We could tell our stories of relationships in our own terms
without forcing them to sound just like everyone else's."13 9 Cain argued more
specifically that litigators "combine substantive due process claims that focus
on conduct with equal protection claims that focus on status." 4 0 The substantive due process claim that Cain envisioned would focus on the fundamental
importance of lesbian and gay conduct, whereas the equal protection claim she

132. Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick,
79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (1993).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1722, 1771.

135. Cain, supra note 47, at 1558 (commenting on the lack of unity in the gay rights movement in
the post-World War I era).
136. Id. at 1640 (footnote omitted).
137. Id.
138. Case, supra note 102, at 1681 (citing Cain, supra note 47, at 1627, 1633-34).
139. Cain, supra note 47, at 1639.

140. Id. at 1619.
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envisioned would "attack the irrationality of the discriminatory classification." 1 4 1 She called this a "nonbifurcation strategy," and Cain advocated the use
of such a strategy because it would "prevent courts from inferring 'conduct ...
from the mere fact of status."'l 4 2 But taking a safe route in order to win some
(but not all) civil rights battles, rather than none (but not some), was not
unreasonable, even according to Cain, who conceded that she could tolerate a
"limited bifurcation" strategy-one where "litigators should not consider it
necessary to bifurcate status from all conduct," but could birfurcate it from all
conduct except sodomy (because at that time sodomy was criminal). 1 4 3
Case noted that what was notably absent from Cain's history of litigating for
gay and lesbian rights were same-sex couples and the details of their copulation.144 Case observed that "[c]ourts accord the most favorable treatment to
those gay men and lesbians involved in close, long-term relationships from
According to Case,
which the sexual aspect has perforce been removed.. ..
gay rights advocates should not highlight the details of what was at one time
referred to as "the behavior that defines the class" 4 6 when litigating sodomy
cases. Case argued against Cain's suggestion that "gay rights advocates should
focus more attention .. . on the specifics of one form of coupling-copula,,147

tion ....
Case argued against the likely effectiveness of Halley's and Cain's increased
focus on sexual acts on the basis of its lack of precedential support. She also
argued that this increased focus on sexual acts presented substantial risks. 14 8
One risk was political; Case argued that Cain's proposal could "fracture the gay
community into 'sodomites' and 'nonsodomites."' 1 4 9 Though Case argued that
Halley's proposal was less risky than Cain's (because Halley's proposal was not
a strategy to be employed in litigation but instead a strategy to reorganize the
bases for political alliances), she argued that Halley's proposal would, like
Cain's, "divide the gay community," but along an axis even more controversial
than the axis of identity that Halley sought to avoid. Case argued that Halley's
alliance "would benefit those whose sexual activity most closely resemble[d]

141. Id. at 1633.
142. Case, supra note 102, at 1681-82 (quoting Cain, supra note 47, at 1627).
143. Cain, supra note 47, at 1624.
144. See Case, supra note 102 (commenting on the absence of the couple from the history of gay
rights litigation, as reconstructed by Pat Cain in Cain, supra note 47).
145. Id. at 1644.

146. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the Court [in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the
class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class
is invidious.").
147. Case, supra note 102, at 1645. Though Case argued against both Cain's and Halley's suggestions that gay rights advocates focus on the details of sexual activity on the ground that "[n]either
proposal w[ould] work," she was careful to circumscribe her commentary to the provision of insights
rather than affirmative litigation strategies. Id. at 1682, 1694.
148. See id. at 1688.
149. Id.
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that of the majority of heterosexuals and exclude those most different from
heterosexuals in their practices." 1 50 After all, an alliance based on acts would
necessarily depend on the "identity or similarity between acts" performed by
allies.15 ' Another risk presented by an increased focus on sexual acts was legal;
Case argued that forcing the legal system to confront the details of gay sex
would "provoke a worse reaction"1 5 2 from the legal system than what Cain
herself had characterized as the legal system's then-current "negative judgment
against all things homosexual." 5 3
This earlier debate about difference in the gay rights movement was a debate
about how best to preserve qualities of a discriminated minority group that
make that group different. After all, the group's differentiating qualities were
also the reasons that the group suffered discrimination and therefore the reason
for the existence of the movement to advance the group's rights. These debates,
while parts of the same social movement, differ essentially from each other in
two important ways. First, current debates about the LGBT rights movement
lack agreement among all debate participants that the movement's purpose is to
obtain the right for its constituents to exercise their differences. Second, and
related, current debates lack the earlier debate's shared commitment among
participants to avoid the movement's fracture and division between those who
seem most different from the rest of society and those who seem most similar to
it.
This earlier debate exemplified agreement about the gay rights movement's
purpose to obtain the right for its constituents to exercise their differences. Case
disagreed with Halley and Cain about the appropriate strategy to be employed
for the purpose of obtaining the rights to form pair bonds and to copulate. These
two activities are the qualities of gays and lesbians that make them different;
they are "exactly what gay men and lesbians may want to do and what troubles
society when they try to do [them]."' 54 But all three participants in this debate
agreed on the purpose of strategizing within the gay rights movement: to secure
the rights to form pair bonds and to copulate.
Because all three scholars agreed on the movement's purpose to protect the
right to be different, they shared a second and related commitment to avoid the
movement's fracture and division between those who seem most different from
society and those who seem most similar to it. In fact, the strength of Case's
attack on Halley and Cain is in its irony. Case argued not only that Halley's and
Cain's proposals would not achieve the gay rights movement's purpose, about
which all three scholars agreed, but that their proposals would achieve the exact
opposite of that purpose, namely the movement's fracture and division. Case
demonstrated that the risk of highlighting gays' and lesbians' differences was
150. Id. at 1689.
151. Id.
152. Id.

153. Id. (citing Cain, supra note 47, at 1592).
154. Id. at 1643.
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that doing so would likely generate benefits for gays and lesbians who were the
least different from heterosexuals.15 5 And of course, these individuals were also
those within the movement who were the least likely to experience discrimination.
This earlier debate about the gay rights movement did not prevent the
movement from achieving incremental but impressive victories since its occurrence just under twenty years ago. 15 6 Of course, this earlier debate about gay
rights differs in other ways from the current debates about LGBT rights, and
arguably in ways that may complicate a direct comparison between the two
debates. However, the opportunity exists to compare these debates-which
pertain to the future of different versions of the same civil rights movement-so
as to derive insights about the arguable success that the first debate allowed and
the arguable failure toward which the second set of debates may be contributing. The current LGBT rights movement is plagued by intense disagreement
about the inclusion of bisexual and transgender people-those who challenge
the movement's collective commitment to preserving the right to be differentand the movement's resulting regrettably fractured state between those who are
"straight, but for the fact that they're gay" and those whose rights are most
violated.157 Meanwhile the earlier debate about the gay rights movement,
despite disagreement, contained a shared commitment to preserve the right to
form pair bonds and copulate-rights that have been achieved in the years since
the occurrence of the debate-and a commitment to avoid the fracturing of the
movement by excluding those who are most different, and most in need of its
support, from it.
III.

BISEXUALITY AND THE LAW

Though legal scholarship has addressed bisexuality only in rare moments,15 8
Yoshino's epistemic contract of erasure answered Ruth Colker's earlier call for
a "bi jurisprudence" 15 9 and explained why the "vast and vastly unacknowledged
wall between heterosexual and homosexual identities" that Naomi Mezey identified has been so "vigilantly maintained." 16 0 But whereas earlier scholarship

155. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
157. See supra section II.B.
158. There has, however, been a recent flurry of interest among legal scholars in the topic of
bisexuality. See, e.g., Heron Greenesmith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality
Fits into LGBT Legal Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 65 (2010).
In addition, Michael Boucai, the current Sears Law Teaching Fellow at The Williams Institute at UCLA
School of Law, the leading think tank dedicated to the field of sexual-orientation law and public policy,
is currently working on projects that relate to bisexuality. See Faculty Biography of Michael Boucai,
UCLA SCH. OF LAw, http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=3452 (last visited Dec. 8, 2011)
("His current projects deal with bisexuality's obscured centrality to debates about gay rights . . . .").
159. COLKER, supra note 1 (introducing a perspective that rejects conventional bipolar categories in
the areas of gender, race, and disability).
160. Mezey, supra note 2, at 100.
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observed an erasure of the bisexual, this Article observes a spotlight shining on
him. Section III.A describes in further detail the phenomenon of bisexual
erasure and section III.B describes the shift away from erasure and towards the
current era of bisexual hypervisibility. Whether bisexuals have been erased or
are instead spotlighted and therefore hypervisible, they have continued to suffer
distinct harms. Section III.C explains the nature of those harms.
A. BISEXUAL ERASURE

Though Colker and Mezey wrote about bisexuality and the law before
Yoshino, Yoshino examined bisexuals with more of a descriptive lens than they
did. 161 He did not advocate any particular solution to the problem of bisexual
erasure, instead offering what has served as the definitive explanation of why
bisexuals have been erased. His project was not exclusively descriptive, to be
sure; he argued that bisexuals should be rendered more visible in the legal
realm, particularly in the realm of sexual harassment law. Yoshino argued that
the reason to promote bisexual visibility was to represent accurately the fluid
nature of human sexuality.
In explaining why he believed that bisexuals had been erased to the point of
invisibility (a phenomenon for whose existence he argued convincingly), Yoshino wrote about the "epistemic contract of bisexual erasure," the tacit agreement between both homosexuals and heterosexuals (collectively, "monosexuals")
to erase bisexuals.16 2 Yoshino defined this agreement as "a contract in the sense
that a social contract is a contract," meaning that it was "not a conscious
arrangement between individuals, but rather a social norm that ar[ose] unconsciously."1 6 3 And parties to this social or epistemic contract-heterosexuals and
homosexuals-erased bisexuals by employing three strategies: class erasure,
individual erasure, and deligitimation. Class erasure was the denial of the entire
category of bisexuality.'" Individual erasure permitted the recognition of the
category of bisexuality, but referred to the contestation that any particular
individual was a bisexual, a contestation that tends to accompany a monosexual's reference to one or more of the pervasive myths about bisexuals' nonexistence. 1 6 5 And deligitimation referred to the acknowledgement of the existence
of bisexuals, as a class and also as individuals, but with the attachment to
bisexuals of a stigma. 16 6
Yoshino argued that monosexuals shared an interest in erasing bisexuals for
three reasons. First, both dominant sexual-orientation groups had an interest in
proving a monosexual identity:

161. See infra section IV.A for elaboration of Colker's and Mezey's positions.
162. See Yoshino, supra note 3.
163. Id. at 391-92.

164. Id. at 395.
165. Id. at 396; see also supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.

166. Id.
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[S]traights (for example) can only prove that they are straight by adducing
evidence of cross-sex desire.

. .

. But this means that straights can never

definitively prove that they are straight in a world in which bisexuals exist, as
the individual who adduces cross-sex desire could be either straight or
bisexual, and there is no definitive way to arbitrate between those two
possibilities. 167
The same was true for gays: they could only prove that they were gay by
offering evidence of same-sex desire, evidence that was called into question
when bisexuals offered the same. The second interest that monosexuals shared
was that in "retaining the importance of sex as a distinguishing trait in society . . . because to be straight or gay is to discriminate erotically on the basis of

sex."' 6 8 And third, because "bisexuals [we]re often perceived to be 'intrinsically' nonmonogamous,"l 6 9 heterosexuals and homosexuals erased bisexuals in
order to defend the norm of monogamy. Each of Yoshino's three interests was
slightly different, but all of them demonstrated an anxiety that monosexuals had
about preserving the stability of certain categories-monosexual identity, sex,
and monogamy.
Yoshino argued that increasing bisexual visibility would effect a change in
sexual-harassment doctrine, a change that he argued was necessary because of
the doctrine's imposition of a particular harm on bisexuals. At the time Yoshino
wrote, the most famous mention of bisexuality in case law was the then largely
hypothetical example of the so-called bisexual harasser,' 7 0 a mostly fictional
character who first appeared in the 1975 case, Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
where the judge dismissed allegations of sexual harassment because the alleged
harasser, a male whose actions were directed toward females, was merely
"satisfying a personal urge." 17 ' The judge then demonstrated why such desirebased harassment should not fit within the definition of sexual harassment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:172 "to do so would mean that if the
conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be no basis
for suit."' 73 The bisexual harasser appeared again in the 1977 case, Barnes v.
Costle, this time by name, when the court noted that "[i]n the case of the

167. Id. at 362.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 363.

170. This discussion tracks Yoshino's discussion of the same. See id. at 434-58.
171. 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated,562 F2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
172. Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). This statutory
language has been interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace. See Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (establishing that hostile environment sexual harassment can
constitute unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII). For a novel reading of the Court's
decision in Meritor, see Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 205,

220-33 (2009).
173. Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
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bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender
discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike." 7 4
In neither of these cases, however, was the bisexual-harasser defense actually
raised-these cases merely pointed out the possibility of a hypothetical bisexual
harasser.
At the time Yoshino wrote, the bisexual-harasser defense had actually been
raised in only two cases and was not accepted in either case.175 For this reason,
courts deciding cases at the margins of sexual harassment law merely included
in their opinions a "boilerplate phrase in sexual harassment cases,"17 6 namely
the Eleventh Circuit's statement that "[e]xcept in the exceedingly atypical case
of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex."' 7 7 Yoshino demonstrated that whether one adopted a
"desire-based theory" that sexual harassment is actionable only if the harassment is sexual in nature, or instead a "because of . . . sex" theory that sexual
harassment is actionable because it would not have occurred but for the victim's
sex,' 7 1 the bisexual-harasser exemption from sexual-harassment liability had
been, for all practical purposes, closed.17 9
An exemption from liability in sexual harassment law that had not been
closed, on the other hand, was the horseplay exemption. Under this exemption,
certain conduct would not be held to constitute sexual harassment, but instead
would be considered nonsexual horseplay. 80 For example, a coach's smacking
a football player on the buttocks would likely qualify as horseplay rather than
sexual harassment. The logic behind the horseplay exemption was that "this is
football[, and] some homosocial acts are so transparently homosocial that they
cannot be read any other way."'" But, Yoshino argued, closing the bisexualharasser exemption while keeping open the horseplay exemption made clear
that sexual-harassment law failed to recognize the possibility that someone
could be bisexual. And the harm, according to Yoshino, that inhered in the
failure to recognize bisexuality in sexual-harassment law was that liability
turned on status rather than on conduct and, "more specifically, on the sexual
orientation of the actors rather than on the nature of the allegedly harassing
174. 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
175. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (D.D.C. 1995); Ryczek v. Guest
Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to decide the bisexual-harasser question,
but noting that the success of such a defense "would appear to produce an anomalous result" in Title
VII law, and labeling this a "troubling possibility"). For a more elaborate discussion of those cases that
have, have not, and might have been expected to have raised the bisexual-harasser defense, see
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 443 n.486.
176. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 443.
177. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982).
178. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 437 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)) (citing Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692-93, 705-25 (1997)).

179. Id. at 440 ("As a practical matter, the bisexual harassment exemption has been closed.").
180. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (4th Cir.
1996).
181. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 457.
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acts." 182
Just after the publication of Yoshino's article, the Seventh Circuit accepted
the bisexual-harasser defense in Holman v. Indiana,183 a case in which married
couple Steven and Karen Holman-who both worked in the maintenance
department at the Indiana Department of Transportation-together filed claims
of sexual harassment against Gale Ulrich, their foreman who allegedly approached each of them separately for sexual favors and retaliated against each
of them for rejecting his approaches.1 8 4 The court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the Holmans' sexual-harassment claims and stated that it "d[id] not
think ... it is anomalous for a Title VII remedy to be precluded when both

sexes are treated badly. Title VII is predicated on discrimination. Given this
premise, requiring disparate treatment is consistent with the statute's purpose of
preventing such treatment."18 5 It is unlikely that the reopening of the exemption
from sexual-harassment liability for the bisexual harasser pleased Yoshino, on
the basis of his theory. But ultimately, the exemption has continued to remain
relatively closed, despite the existence of the Holman decision. Holman signified nothing if not the beginning of a new era, one in which bisexuals are no
longer harmed by implication and therefore erased from existence, but are
instead hypervisible. Now, those who are not monosexual are singled out on
that very basis.
B.

A SPOTLIGHT ON BISEXUALITY

Since Yoshino identified the phenomenon of bisexual erasure and the resulting invisibility of the bisexual from sexual-orientation law and the LGBT rights
movement, bisexuality has gone from being erased to the point of invisibility to
being hypervisible. More recent cases, which this section elaborates, differ in
two important ways from the erasure that Yoshino described. First, while
Yoshino described a tacit erasure, more recent cases seem to address bisexuality
explicitly. Second, while Yoshino described bisexual erasure to have been
effected equally by both heterosexuals and homosexuals, newer spotlighting
efforts seem to be conducted primarily by homosexuals and their advocates.
1. The Bisexual World Series
On April 20, 2010, the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) and the
law firm of K&L Gates LLP filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington on behalf of Steven Apilado, LaRon
Charles, and Jon Russ, three bisexual members of the San Francisco Gay
Softball League whose team, D2, advanced to the 2008 Gay Softball World
Series in Seattle, an event run by the North American Gay Amateur Athletic

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 435-36.
211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 404.
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Association (NAGAAA). The NAGAAA had a rule that no team participating
in the World Series could have among its members more than two heterosexuals. 18 6 Washington's public accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.' 8 7
During the World Series championship, another participating team challenged
the eligibility of D2 to play on the basis of the NAGAAA's heterosexual cap of
two team members.' 8 8 Despite the NAGAAA's stated mission of promoting
"amateur sports competition, particularly softball, for all persons regardless of
age, sexual orientation or preference, with special emphasis on the participation
of members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender community," five
members of D2 were summoned by the NAGAAA to a room with over
twenty-five people, in front of whom the players were expected to answer
"whether they were 'predominantly attracted to men' or 'predominantly attracted to women,' without the option of answering that they were attracted to
both." 18 9 After the players answered these questions, "a panel voted on whether
[each] was 'gay' or 'non-gay' . . . refus[ing] to entertain the idea that the players
could be bisexual."l 90 The panel ultimately decided by vote that Apilado,
Charles, and Russ were not gay."' The panel also "recommended disciplinary
measures against [the players,] their team, and the San Francisco Gay Softball
League, including forcing ... D2[] to retroactively forfeit their second-place
World Series win." 19 2 Moreover, the NCLR reported that, "[i]n response to a
player's statement that he was attracted to both men and women, a NAGAAA
member responded,
'This is the Gay World Series, not the Bisexual World
93

Series."'l

This lawsuit, which has now settled,19 4 has been called a "legal first"19 5
because it involved a lawsuit for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation filed against a group intended for mostly gays. But the suit was a first for
another reason: in claiming discrimination on the basis of plaintiffs' bisexuality,
the lawsuit highlighted the differences between bisexuality and homosexuality.

186, Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, NCLR Files Suit Challenging Discriminatory
Athletic Policy (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename= press
Apilado-vNAGAAO42010.
187. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.215 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162.26.010
(2009).
188. See Press Release, supra note 186.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Incidentally, it should be noted, too-as it is in NCLR's press release-that all three of these
players were non-White. The panel questioned two other members of D2, both of whom were White,
and decided by vote that these players were gay. See id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See McDonald, supra note 9.
195. See Lisa Keen, Gay Group Sues Gay Groupfor Bias Against Bisexuals, KEEN NEws SERV. (Apr.
21, 2010), http://www.keennewsservice.com/2010/04/21/gay-group-sues-gay-group-for-bias-againstbisexuals/.
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Despite the fact that this lawsuit was brought on behalf of three bisexuals, a
May 2011 order in the case noted that "th[e] Order d[id] not mention bisexuality
in any sense." 9 6 This order held that the NAGAAA had a constitutional right
because of its classification as an expressive association to exclude anybody
who did not share its values, such as heterosexuals.1 9 7 In the order, Judge
Coughenour concluded that though the plaintiffs had "framed th[e] case as a
matter of bisexual rights," the case involved the "intrusive and disrespectful"
nature of the NAGAAA's inquiry into plaintiffs' sexual orientation.198
Of course, a determination of how intrusive and disrespectful were the
NAGAAA's inquiries into plaintiffs' sexual orientations depended, as it would
for any expressive association, on an analysis of the association's expressive
purpose.' 99 Though the Supreme Court has held that courts should "give
deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression
[and] . . . what would impair its expression," such deference is "not abso-

lute."2 00 In order for the NAGAAA to argue successfully that it had a constitutional right as an expressive association to exclude Apilado, Charles, and Russ,
the organization needed to demonstrate to the court that it had an explicit
message.
The NAGAAA provided to the court such an explicit message in time for its
inclusion in a subsequent November 2011 order.2 01 The court quoted the
NAGAAA's message: "NAGAAA has chosen to send a message through the
annual Gay Softball World Series that athletes can play competitive team sports
'as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals,' and to 'demonstrate that there
are such men and women."' 2 0 2 On the basis of this message, the court granted
the NAGAAA's motion for partial summary judgment on the basis of the
plaintiffs' failure to show that the state's interest in eliminating the NAGAAA's
exclusionary policy outweighed the NAGAAA's constitutional rights as an
expressive association.2 03
2. This, That, and Then This Again: Bisexuality and Same-Sex Marriage
Until recently, bisexuals have not really factored much into the debate about
legally recognizing same-sex marriage. After all, bisexuals have the right to
marry in every state. Of course, this right is contingent upon bisexuals' choosing to marry someone of the opposite sex. On this basis Yoshino argued that
196. See Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, No. C 10-0682, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash.
May 27, 2011).
197. See id. at 3, 15.
198. Id. at 3-4.
199. See id. at 12-15.
200. Id. at 12 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
201. See Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, No. C10-0682 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10,
2011).
202. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995)).
203. See id. at 5.
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bisexuals experienced a harm exactly the same as the harm experienced by gays
as a result of prohibitions against same-sex marriage, namely that those prohibitions "violate[] sex discrimination norms."2 0 Seeking to isolate a harm particular to bisexuals, Yoshino argued that a bisexual might be harmed by the failure
to recognize same-sex marriage because the state "impedes [the bisexual] from
seeing 'through' sex to other traits that she may find more important," 20 5 but he
noted that this was a weak argument for bisexual harm.2 06 Michael Boucai, in a
forthcoming article, argues that prohibitions against same-sex marriage "substantially burden a right to choose homosexual relations and relationships" in
violation of the Court's protection of sexual liberty in Lawrence v. Texas.20 7 But
Boucai employs bisexuality in his article "as an illuminating perspective from
which to apprehend the heterosexual coerciveness of marriage," 20 8 not to isolate
harms particular to bisexuals. 2 0 9 Because bisexuals arguably do not present any
issues particular to their bisexuality with respect to the right to marry, bisexuals
do not tend to play a role in the same-sex marriage debate. 210 Freedom to
Marry, "the campaign to win marriage nationwide," 2 11 includes a page on its
website entitled "Why Marriage Matters to the Bisexual Community," which
includes the following quotation from Alan Hamilton, a former president of the
East Coast Bisexual Network and a cofounder of the Unitarian-Universalist
Bisexual Network:
Think about it: Even a bisexual married to someone of another gender knows
that her/his partner could die from an accident or disease and leave her/him
alone. After recovering from that loss, their next relationship might be with
someone of the same gender. She/he will want the same rights as they
currently have in a mixed-gender relationship. A bi person who is dating or in
a committed same-gender relationship also wants the same rights as straightidentified people. For all these reasons, bi people have been active in Freedom

204. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 459.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 459-60.
207. Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage:An Argument from Bisexuality, SAN

DIEGo L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
208. Id.
209. See id. at 27 ("The channeling of bisexuals into heterosexuality is ultimately 'a special case of a
general phenomenon.' In its legal mechanisms, the pressure brought to bear on bisexuals is essentially
the same as that imposed on homosexuals and even heterosexuals ..... (footnote omitted) (quoting
Clifford Rosky)).
210. Legal scholarship has only addressed the specific role of bisexuals in the same-sex marriage
debate in a couple of instances. See Boucai, supra note 207; Karla C. Robertson, Note, PenetratingSex
and Marriage: The Progressive Potential of Addressing Bisexuality in Queer Theory, 75 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1375 (1998) (arguing that, by focusing on the place of bisexuals in the same-sex-marriage debate,
scholars can expose legal marriage's dependency on the act of penis-vagina penetration).
211. About Freedom to Marry, FREEDOM To MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/about-us

(last visited Dec. 13, 2011).
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To Marry and the Equal Marriage movement since its inception, and continue
their strong support. 212
On this theory, marriage matters to the bisexual community because a
bisexual person might enter into a same-sex relationship.
Bisexuality seems to have found its way into Perry v. Schwarzenegger,2 1 3 the
high-profile and controversial 2 14 federal same-sex marriage trial challenging the
constitutionality of California's Proposition 8. A bit about the Perry case as it
relates to the same-sex marriage debate: Proposition 8, a ballot initiative to
amend the California Constitution by adding Section 7.5, which provided that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California," 2 15 passed with 52.1%. of Californians' votes in the November 2008
election. 2 1 6 Its passage effectively overturned the California Supreme Court's
decision in In re Marriage Cases,217 which had held unconstitutional California's previous statutory bans against same-sex marriage because "statutes that
treat persons differently because of their sexual orientation should be subjected
to strict scrutiny" under California's equal protection clause,2 18 and the statutory
bans at issue in that case failed the strict scrutiny standard of review because
"the interest in retaining the traditional and well-established definition of marriage . . . [could n]ot properly be viewed as a compelling state interest for

purposes of the equal protection clause, or as necessary to serve such an
interest." 2 19
The plaintiffs in Perry argued that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional because
it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, an argument

212. Why Marriage Matters to the Bisexual Community, FREEDOM To MARRY, http://archive-

freedomtomarry.org/get informed/communities/bisexuals.php (last visited Dec. 13, 2011).
213. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012).
214. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join To Fight CaliforniaGay MarriageBan, N.Y.

TIMEs (May 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/28marriage.html. Not everyone in the
gay rights movement, however, was thrilled by the sudden intervention of the two limelight-grabbing
but otherwise untested players-lawyers David Boies and Theodore Olson-in the bruising battle over
Proposition 8. Some expressed confusion at the men's motives and outright annoyance at the possibility
that a loss before the Supreme Court could spoil the chances of future lawsuits on behalf of same-sex
marriage. "It's not something that didn't occur to us," said Matt Coles, the director of the LGBT project
at the American Civil Liberties Union, at the time the suit was filed. "Federal court? Wow. Never
thought of that." Id.
215. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 7.5; see also Letters from Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail J. Knight, Martin F.
Gutierrez, Hak-Shing William Tam, and Mark A. Jansson, to Initiative Coordinator, Office of the
California Attorney General (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/cms-pdfs/initiatives/
i737_07-0068_Initiative.pdf (delivering the text of the proposed measure to the California Attorney
General).
216. Tamara Audi, Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J.

(Nov. 5, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl22586056759900673.html.
217. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
218. Id. at 442.
219. Id. at 401.

1032

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 100:997

which the Ninth Circuit ultimately accepted.220 In Romer v. Evans,22 1 the
Supreme Court invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2, which would have prevented any Colorado municipality from recognizing homosexuals, lesbians, or
bisexuals as a protected class, 2 2 2 because it "seem[ed] inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects" and therefore "lack[ed] a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests." 2 2 3 When Vaughn Walker, then-Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,224 held Proposition 8 unconstitutional, he found that
Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply [we]re
not as good as opposite sex couples ...

[w]hether ... based on moral

disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a
belief that a relationship between a man and a woman [wa]s inherently better
than a relationship between two men or two women .... 225
As the plaintiffs in Perry sought to invalidate Proposition 8 because it
discriminated against people on the basis of their sexual orientation, it was not
surprising that on direct examination, attorneys David Boies and Ted Olson
asked their clients about their sexual orientations. For example, Boies asked
plaintiff Jeffrey Zarrillo, "Are you gay?" to which Zarrillo responded, "Yes, I
am"; Zarrillo responded to Boies's next question, "How long have you been
gay?" by saying, "As long as I can remember." 2 2 6 Boies asked Zarrillo about the
sexual orientation of his partner, Paul Katami, by asking, "Now, today you are
in a committed relationship with another gay man, correct?" Zarrillo responded
in the affirmative.2 27 Boies addressed Katami's sexual orientation by asking him
on direct examination, "Now, you say you were a natural-born gay. Does that
mean you've always been gay?" to which Katami responded, "As long as I can

220. Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929-30 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Perry
v. Brown, No. 10-16696, slip op. at 4-6 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (affirming the unconstitutionality of
Proposition 8, but narrowing the grounds for its invalidation). The Equal Protection Clause provides
that "[no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
221. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
222. Id. at 623-24.
223. Id. at 632.
224. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Vaughn R. Walker, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://

www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=2483&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Dec. 13, 2011)
(noting that Judge Walker retired from the bench in February 2011).
225. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (citation omitted); see also William Eskridge, Jr. & Darren
Spedale, Who Will Win the Gay Marriage Trial?, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/
2242957 (opining, after the close of testimony in Perry, that "[i]f Judge Walker finds that Proposition 8
reflected nothing but prejudice or animus against lesbian and gay people, he will rule it unconstitutional," based on the Romer precedent).
226. Transcript of Record at 77, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C-09-2292), available at
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/201 0/01/Perry-Vol- 1-1-11- 10.pdf.
227. Id. at 79.
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remember, yes."22 8 When questioning Kris Perry, Olson asked her, "How would
you describe your sexual orientation?" to which Perry responded, "I am a
lesbian."22 9 Olson then pursued a line of questioning with Perry, asking her to
address the mutability of her sexual orientation: whether she thought that she
had been born with her lesbian sexual orientation, and whether she thought that
it could ever change. 23 0
But the most telling exchange was between Olson and plaintiff Sandy Stier.
Stier had been married to a man. When Olson asked her on direct examination
to describe her sexual orientation, Stier responded, "I'm gay."2 3 1 Stier claimed
to have learned that she was gay "fairly late in life, in [her] mid-thirties." 2 3 2 She
admitted that at the time she was married to a man-from 1987 to 1999-she
had no feeling that she was a lesbian. She admitted, too, that her marriage to
this man "start[ed] out with the best intentions" 233 and that she "love[d] him
when [she] married him." 2 3 4 And though Stier met Kris Perry, a woman with
whom she has now been in a relationship for over a decade,2 35 in 1996, she
testified that her "sexual orientation or [her] discovery of [her] sexual orientation ha[d nothing] to do with the dissolution of [her] marriage." 2 3 6 When asked
how convinced she was that she was gay, Stier answered: "Well, I'm convinced,
because at 47 years old I have fallen in love one time and it's with Kris." 2 3 7
Olson asked Stier: "How convinced are you that you are gay? You've lived
with a husband. You said you loved him. Some people might say, 'Well, it's this
and then it's that and it could be this again.' Answer that." 2 3 8 To be sure, the
argument here is not that Olson's question was unreasonable, particularly in
light of the lawsuit's allegation that Proposition 8 discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation. But his question assumed that Stier needed to identify as gay
in order to have the right to marry. Olson made reference in his question to a
myth about bisexuals, which "some people might" believe, namely that bisexuals are promiscuous, indecisive, and occupy a transitional sexual orientation that
may change at some point.2 3 9 As already noted, Stier responded to Olson as
follows: "Well, I'm convinced, because at 47 years old I have fallen in love one

228. Id. at 91.

229. Id. at 140.
230. Id. at 140-41 (responding in the affirmative that she felt she had been born with the tendency
toward sexual attraction to women and in the negative about her "sense that [her sexual orientation]
might somehow change").
231. Id. at 161.
232. Id. at 161-63.
233. Id. at 162.
234. Id. at 165.
235. Sandy Stier testified that she realized that she had fallen in love with Kris Perry in 1999. Id. at
164.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 167.
238. Id. at 166-67.

239. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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time and it's with Kris." 24 0
A couple of things are notable about Olson's exchange with Stier. First, Olson
wanted Stier to demonstrate that she was very convinced she was gay, undoubtedly because her sexual history suggested that she could switch the sex of her
sexual partner unpredictably at any time. Second, in demonstrating that she was
very convinced that she was gay, Stier presented the following argument:
I have been in love only once.
I have been in love with a woman.
Therefore, I am capable of falling in love with women only.
Both Olson's question and Stier's answer demonstrate separate but related
assumptions that have operated silently as a part of the fight for gay rights.
Olson's purpose in his examination of Stier, and in the context of the Perry
lawsuit as a general matter, was to secure marriage rights for Stier, Perry, and
the other plaintiffs who are parties to the lawsuit. And while same-sex marriage
is a gay rights issue, it is worth noting that Olson has suggested through this line
of questioning that Stier should be afforded marriage rights if and only if her
gay identity is stable.
Stier's answer to Olson presents an additional opportunity to unearth an
assumption that has animated same-sex-marriage litigation. That is the assumption that an individual's attraction to one specific person demonstrates the
individual's attraction to other people who possess the person's sex characteristic. For illustrative purpose, consider for a moment if Olson had asked Stier not
how convinced she was that she was*gay but instead how convinced she was
that she would always be attracted to people with green eyes. In order to
demonstrate to Olson that she was very convinced of this fact about herself,
Stier's answer would take the following logical form if she employed the same
logic when answering this question as she had when answering Olson's question
about her sexual orientation:
I have been in love only once.
I have been in love with a person with green eyes.
Therefore, I am capable of falling in love with people with green eyes only.
When framed this way, Stier's response seems strange. After all, it is very
common to hear that an individual has partnered with someone who is not her
"type." Moreover, if an individual partners with someone who is not her type,
she is not expected to change her type but can comfortably articulate that while
she is typically attracted to people with blue eyes and continues to be, she has
240. Transcript of Record at 167, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C-09-2292), available at
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-10.pdf.
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chosen to partner with someone with green eyes. When the characteristic is eye
color, or even race, an individual can talk about the difference between her
general "type" and the characteristics of her partner to explain a difference
between the two, if one exists.
But the rationale that Stier offered to substantiate her lesbianism signifies an
assumption that rests at the core of the current conception of sexual orientation.
Stier testified that because she had fallen in love only once, and because she had
fallen in love with a woman, she was convinced that she was gay. It may be that
Stier felt a more profound love for Kris Perry than she had felt for her late
husband. But the way that Stier presented evidence of her sexual orientation
demonstrated that she believed something to be true not only about her own
sexual orientation but about the nature of sexual orientation, and that is that
being (generally) gay and being attracted to a specific, single member of the
same sex are connected.
Stier may have been convinced. She may have even become convinced
because she fell in love one time with another woman. But if Stier, prior to
meeting Kris Perry, had been attracted to people with blue eyes only, and Perry
had green eyes, Stier would probably not encounter an interlocutor asking how
convinced she was that she was now attracted to people with green eyes. If ever
confronted with a question about Kris's eye color, Stier could just explain that
while she was generally attracted to those with blue eyes, she happened to fall
in love with someone whose eyes were green. When the characteristic is sex, for
some reason an individual will have difficulty explaining the difference between
her general type and the sex of her partner. One might argue that sex, unlike eye
color or even race, is not a type. Sex, one might say, is the essential characteristic on the basis of which individuals choose to associate intimately. For manyand for bisexuals-this is simply not true.
C. THE ESSENCE OF BISEXUAL DISCRIMINATION

The Apilado case and the dialogue between Olson and Stier in Perry not only
demonstrate a shift away from the era of bisexual erasure, but also demonstrate
a growing desire on the part of LGBT rights advocates to distance themselves
from perceived instability in sexual orientation. Consider the details of the
settlement in Apilado as an example: the case ultimately settled in exchange for
the NAGAAA's agreement to welcome an unlimited number of bisexual (and
transgender) players into the softball league in the future and payment of an
undisclosed fee to Apilado, Charles, and Russ.2 4 1
But recall the NAGAAA's message.24 2 The organization announced a purpose "to send a message through the annual Gay Softball World Series that
athletes can play competitive team sports 'as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual

241. McDonald, supra note 9.
242. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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individuals,' and to 'demonstrate that there are such men and women."' 2 4 3 In
light of that message, it seems likely that, even under the terms of the settlement
agreement, any prospective bisexual players will be required to declare openly
their bisexuality in order to obtain league membership from the NAGAAA.
This outcome may ameliorate the negative effects of the NAGAAA's discrimination against some bisexuals (or at the very least those who self-identify as
bisexuals). But this outcome would not have helped individuals like Apilado,
Charles, or Russ. These three players did not declare their bisexuality to the
NAGAAA before their dismissal from the league. They only answered questions posed to them about the sex toward which they were predominantly
attracted, from which conclusions were drawn about whether they were gay
and, on that basis, whether they could play softball in the league's world
series. 2 In effect, the terms of the NAGAAA's settlement to the Apilado case,
coupled with its message, form a "Tell, Because We Won't Ask" policy under
which the organization may discriminate against those who have not declared
that they are gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
The terms of the NAGAAA's settlement with these players might protect
from discrimination some prospective players who would have been excluded
in the absence of these terms. But the NAGAAA's new policy to include
self-identifying bisexuals does nothing to protect prospective players who
experience discrimination for the very reason that Apilado, Charles, and Russ
did-because they failed to conform to the organization's expectations about
individuals' sexual orientations.
The thing that "troubles society"245 about bisexuals is the extent to which
they do not fit neatly into established sexual-orientation categories. Though this
quality certainly complicates the task of protecting bisexuality, it is the quality
about bisexuals-like coupling and copulation are for gays and lesbians-that
differentiates them from the rest of society. By agreeing to create a new
category within its membership roster for bisexuals, the NAGAAA has agreed
to dedicate a new category to bisexuals who lack the essential quality of
bisexuality. The NAGAAA's new policy has the effect of protecting bisexuals
who are "gay, but for the fact that they're bisexual" just as the gay rights
movement has protected homosexuals who are "straight, but for the fact that
they're gay." And for this reason, the NAGAAA's policy will not effect protection against discrimination on the basis of bisexuality.
The failure to protect self-identified bisexual employees in the United Kingdom-who, according to two recent surveys, felt that they endured more
scrutiny from their colleagues at work than did homosexuals, and that this
additional scrutiny fueled "the perception that bisexuals are unstable, unreliable,
243. Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, No. CO-0682-JCC, at 2-3 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 10, 2011) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 561
(1995)) (emphasis omitted).
244. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
245. See Case, supra note 102, at 1643; see also discussion supra section H.C.
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and [even] un-promotable"-may present another instance of bisexual harm.24 6
For similar reasons, the immigration context might also discriminate on the
basis of bisexuality in the application of its "sham marriages act." Pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1325, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
prohibits a noncitizen from marrying a United States citizen for the sole purpose
of gaining citizenship.24 7 In fact, the statute provides that, "[a]ny individual
who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision
of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than [five] years, or
fined not more than $250,000, or both." 2 4 8 What's more, there is a presumption
of marriage fraud that applies to a noncitizen who
obtains any admission into the United States with an immigrant visa ...
procured on the basis of a marriage entered into less than 2 years prior to such
admission ... and which, within 2 years subsequent to any admission ...

shall be judicially annulled or terminated, unless the alien establishes ...
that such marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading .. . the immigration laws .... 249

In all subsequent deportation proceedings, a noncitizen in a marriage entered
into within two years prior to obtaining lawful permanent residence because of
the marriage, which is judicially annulled or terminated within two years after
the lawful permanent resident's (and former noncitizen's) entry to the United
States, has the burden of rebutting the presumption that the individual attempted
to evade the immigration laws. 2 5 0 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has
required individuals to rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of evading those
laws.2 51 Moreover, courts reviewing BIA determinations of the fraudulence of
such marriages hold individuals to an even higher burden of proof, requiring
that they present evidence that is "'so compelling that no reasonable fact finder
could fail' to find that [the individual] had a bona fide marriage."25 2 And where
a marriage of this length had been annulled by a state court on the basis of a

246. See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 12; see also Fae, supra note 12 (reporting interim results from the
U.K.'s Workplace Survey, which found that "being bisexual leads individuals to face a number of
challenges and pressures that are very different from those experienced by those who identify as
lesbian, gay or even straight").
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(i).
250. See Janice D. Villiers, Brave New World: The Use and Potential Misuse of DNA Technology in

Immigration Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 239, 269 (2010) (explaining the rules relating to the
prohibition against sham marriages in the immigration context).
251. See Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that petitioner had been required
at the administrative level to demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that [his] marriage was
not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws").
252. Mendes v. INS, 197 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
483-84(1992)).

1038

THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 100:997

finding of fraudulent intent to evade immigration laws, an individual faced not
only a presumption that the marriage was fraudulent but what was called a
"presumption plus." 2 5 3 In meeting these burdens of proof, individuals face an
enormously difficult task, not only because the burdens are very high but also
because evidence of the individual's conduct after the marriage in question may
relate to a determination of its fraudulence. 2 5 4 And such determinations-when
initially made by immigration officials-are "often arbitrary" and have been
"based on racial prejudice and personal bias."2 55
In order to determine the validity of a particular marriage, "[i]mmigration
officials have developed elaborate matrices of factual inquiry,"256 which are
"intensely intrusive into the marital relationship."2 57 The goal of immigration
officials in these situations is essentially to "determin[e] the level of marital
intimacy that the spouses have achieved." 2 5 8
Perhaps unsurprisingly, though exact numbers are unavailable, in 2005 it was
reported "probable that thousands of foreign nationals ha[d] been granted
asylum in the United States on .. . grounds [of sexual orientation, transgender

identity, or HIV status] since 1994.",259 The availability of asylum on these
grounds has derived from the Immigration and Nationality Act's provision for
asylum by establishing "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of ... membership in a particular social group,"2 60 membership that
can be based on any noncitizen's sexual orientation. 26 ' Since 2006, courts have
determined a noncitizen's membership in a particular social group by determining the extent to which such membership was "visible." 26 2 This determination
of group membership on the basis of the "social visibility requirement" has
been criticized because of its potential unfair application against those who are
not "gay enough" to merit protection.2 63 Thus, while there is no reason to

253. See Rodriguez v. INS, 204 F.3d 25, 26-28 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that petitioner had not

sufficiently rebutted such a "presumption plus").
254. See Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975).
255. David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process Under the
Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1747, 1753 (1986) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 39 (1980)).
256. Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for
Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 581 (2010).
257. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and
MarriageFraud,5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 700 (1997).
258. Id.
259. Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the One-Year Filing Deadline on
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgenderand HIV-Positive ForeignNationals Seeking Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y. CrrY L. REV. 233, 239 (2005).

260. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
261. See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming that "all alien
homosexuals are members of a 'particular social group').
262. See Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
263. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defining a "Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and
Gender, 27 YALE L. & PoC'Y REV. 47, 86 (2008) (explaining the social visibility requirement's effective
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believe that fewer noncitizens have experienced persecution on the basis of their
sexual orientations, there may be reason to believe that these claims for asylum
have become less likely to succeed.
Without the availability of asylum, gays and lesbians may seek other avenues
through which to enter the U.S. Of course, "federal law does not allow
American citizens and legal immigrants to seek United States residency for their
same-sex partners." 2 " The incentive thus exists to marry a person of the
opposite sex for the purpose of gaining admission to the U.S. 2 6 5 Previous
attempts by noncitizens who have identified as homosexual to gain admission to
the U.S. by marrying a citizen of the opposite sex have failed because these
marriages have been deemed "sham marriages."26 6
The incentive for a bisexual to enter into such a marriage may be even more
attractive than for a homosexual. The likelihood that a noncitizen who is not
exclusively homosexual would meet the social-visibility requirement to make a
successful asylum claim is lower than that applicable to an exclusively homosexual noncitizen. 67 Moreover, the likelihood that any noncitizen is not exclusively homosexual is higher than the likelihood that the noncitizen is exclusively
homosexual because, as studies of human sexuality have demonstrated, the
likelihood that any individual--citizen or noncitizen-is exclusively homosexual is lower than the likelihood that such an individual is not exclusively
homosexual. 2 6 8 The absence of cases determining the validity for immigration
purposes of marriages involving bisexual (or otherwise not exclusively homosexual) noncitizens is understandable. At this point the case of the bisexual
noncitizen who married a member of the opposite sex, gained citizenship,
subsequently divorced, and then coupled with a member of the same sex has not
appeared in court but has been known to exist. 2 6 9 The likelihood of success for
such noncitizens is even lower than for exclusively homosexual noncitizens

failure to protect those whose sexual orientations are less visible, such as lesbians as opposed to gay
men).
264. Sam Dolnick, For Many Immigrants, Marriage Vote Resonates, N.Y. TIEs (June 27, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/nyregion/gay-marriage-law-seen-as-progress-for-immigrantsrights.html; see also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982) (finding that Congress intended only partners of opposite-sex marriages to be considered
"spouses" under the INA).
265. Of course, such an incentive is not unique to the immigration context. Cf Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir.
2009)) ("[The] court cannot discern a means by which the federal government's denial of benefits to
same-sex spouses might encourage homosexual people to marry members of the opposite sex.").
266. See, e.g., Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that a marriage
between a noncitizen who was "asked an inordinate number of questions concerning [his] homosexuality" and whose testimony indicated "that he was a homosexual before, during, and after his marriage"
was entered into for the purpose of evading immigration laws).
267. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
269. Telephone Interview with Ilona M. Turner, Attorney, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights (Oct. 2009)
(indicating that NCLR has received calls from bisexual individuals claiming that their marriages have
been scrutinized by immigration officials).
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\whose marriages have been scrutinized by immigration officials. After all, the
fact that such noncitizens identify as bisexual would likely cause those within
the LGBT community to view them as fraudulent. 27 0 The idea that the USCIS
would view their marriages any differently seems even less plausible.

IV.

THE PROTECTION OF LIVING IDENTITIES

Sexual-orientation law and the political LGBT rights movement prefer sameness over difference, hoping for clients who are as straight as possible, but for
their homosexuality. Bisexuals differ from both heterosexuals and homosexuals
for the reasons that Yoshino offered to explain their erasure. But bisexuals also
differ from both heterosexuals and homosexuals because they can be defined
along any combination of the axes conventionally used to define sexual orientation: desire, conduct, and self-identification. 2 7 ' Moreover, bisexuals seem to be
discriminated against because of the possibility, perhaps due to their definitional
options, that they could redefine themselves at any moment. Bisexuality is, for
this reason, a moving target, and moving targets cannot fit neatly into the
categorical boxes that are so essential for sexual-orientation law, and for the
broader enterprise of antidiscrimination law. The challenge, then, is to find a
way for bisexual identity-which combines elements of identity status as well
as conduct-to fit within sexual-orientation and antidiscrimination laws' categories even though bisexual identity is predicated to some degree on conduct.
Parts IV and V aim to meet this challenge. Section IV.A reviews earlier
proposals by Colker and Mezey, the former proposing a categorical solution and
the latter a solution to define individuals by reference to their conduct alone.
Section IV.B explains the reason that bisexuality has escaped antidiscrimination
law's protective ambit by reference to what Yoshino termed sexual orientation's
"one act rule," which can be translated to mean that sexual orientation depends
upon conformity between one's status and one's conduct. Section IV.C contextualizes the problem with protecting conduct within the broader landscape of
antidiscrimination law, where Yoshino, in his other work, has described the
law's failure to protect conduct. Finally, section IV.D offers a model for the
protection of status and conduct, which derives from the legal treatment of the
LGBT rights movement's other excluded group: transgender people. This model
will serve as the basis for this Article's ultimate proposal of sexual reorientation
in Part V.
A. CATEGORIES VERSUS CONDUCT
In the legal literature, the work of three scholars-Colker, Mezey, and
Yoshino-constitutes the conversation about bisexual invisibility. 272 Colker and

270. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
271. See discussion supra section I.A.
272. Heron Greenesmith's recent work is also notable. However, this section focuses on those
scholars who have largely examined why bisexuals have been invisible, whereas Greenesmith's work
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Mezey, who wrote at roughly the same time, began the conversation about "'bi'
categories,"27 3 a category of categories that included bisexuality but that, for
Colker, meant more generally the middle between extremes, where multiracial,
bisexual, transgender, and bi-abled 2 7 4 people resided. Mezey and Yoshino wrote
about bisexuals only, 2 7 5 in an effort to resist "the classification of persons
according to a binary system of sexual orientation."2 76 All three scholars can be
understood to have urged a revival of Alfred Kinsey's continuum, preferring it
to a collection of sexual-orientation categories. Mezey and Yoshino both quoted
the classic statement in which Kinsey eschewed a categorical understanding of
sexual orientation:
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are
black nor all things white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely
deals with discrete categories. Only the human mind invents categories and
tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this
concerning human sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex.2 77
In order to reach such a sound understanding, each of the three scholars offered
a slightly different approach. The major difference between each of their
approaches seems to be the extent to which each author embraced categories.
Colker argued for the adoption of more and better categories by the law so that
bisexuals could benefit from protections that were tied to membership in the
monosexual categories of sexual orientation. Mezey and Yoshino, on the other
hand, used bisexuality as a point of entry to critique the use of categorization to
describe sexual-orientation identity at all. For them, sexual orientation was fluid
and would better be described by reference to a continuum than to a collection
of categories. This Article has already explained Yoshino's approach by elaborating on his theory of bisexual erasure. 2 7 8 The sections that follow describe in
further detail Colker's and Mezey's approaches.
1. Better Categories: Colker's Approach
Colker focused on the extent to which categories "perpetuat[ed] bipolar

applies the theory of bisexual invisibility to specific examples in the law. See Greenesmith, supra note
158.
273. Colker, supra note 1,at 1.
274. See id. at 1-2. Colker coined and defined the term "bi-abled" to mean "individuals who are
neither disabled nor able-bodied." Id. at I n.4.
275. See Mezey, supra note 2; Yoshino, supra note 3.
276. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 356 n.5.
277. KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 55, at 639; Mezey, supra note 2, at 103-04; Yoshino, supra

note 3, at 356 n.5.
278. See supra section II.A.
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injustice." 2 7 9 For Colker, categorization itself was not the enemy, but instead
that categories were used inappropriately. An appropriate use for categories
was, according to Colker, ameliorative. Colker argued for a "bi jurisprudence,"280 through which she advocated analyzing the experience of discrimination on the basis of hybrid traits (like bisexuality or multiracial identity), first to
understand better the way we subordinate individuals and, second, to develop
fair and effective ameliorative programs.2 8' Colker argued that grouping individuals into binaries but then forgetting to add a category for individuals who fall
between those binaries has meant that we cannot ascertain the sorts of injustice
that happen to those individuals.
In the sexual-orientation context, Colker warned against proposals-like that
of Arthur Murphy and John Ellington 2 8 2 -to tie benefits to one's identity as a
"true homosexual." This regime disadvantaged those who conducted themselves
homosexually but may not have identified that way, like bisexuals.28 3 Colker
argued for the importance of recognizing the harms that bisexuals suffered as a
result of a commitment to binary categories of sexual orientation, and for this
reason proposed the recognition of the bi category of bisexuality.
2. A Focus on Conduct: Mezey's Approach
Mezey strongly opposed categories, at least as they have been applied in the
context of sexual orientation. She made a two-part argument. First, she argued
for the decoupling of classifications of sexual orientation based on identity from
those based on acts. 28 4 She invoked the example of Bowers v. Hardwick 285 to
make this point. In Hardwick, the Supreme Court concluded that the privacy
right implied in the Due Process Clause did not confer a fundamental right to
engage in consensual homosexual sodomy, when ruling on a facially neutral
Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy. Despite the overruling of Hardwick by
Lawrence2 86 since Mezey wrote, her example is still instructive. She examined
the Court's decision in Hardwick, noting the Court's conflation of sexualorientation identity and behavior. The Hardwick Court spoke of "homosexual
sodomy," despite the fact that the statute upon which its opinion was based was
neutral as to the gender of participants.2 87 Because, as Mezey noted, heterosexu279. COLKER, supra note 1, at 86.
280. Id. at 15.

281. See Colker, supra note 1,at 2-4.
282. See Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance and

Containment II, 97 DICK. L. REv. 693, 709-10 (1993) (arguing that then-existing sodomy laws should
be modified to illegalize sexual intercourse by mouth or anus with another person of the same sex,
unless the accused could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual's sexual partner
was "reasonably believed by the accused to be[] a true homosexual").
283. See Colker,supra note 1,at 35-36.
284. See, e.g., Mezey, supra note 2, at 131 ("To the extent that sexual acts and sexual identity are
rhetorically aligned, bisexuals and homosexuals will always struggle .....
285. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
286. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
287. Mezey, supra note 2, at 122-23 (quoting Hardwick,478 U.S. at 190).
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als perform acts of sodomy, the "[c]onduct, then," of which the Hardwick Court
spoke, "only define[d] homosexual identity."2 8 8 Thus, the conflation of acts and
identities functioned to hurt only those whose identities would ordinarily be
associated with the acts proscribed in the gender-neutral statute.
Mezey also argued for the elimination of sexual-orientation classifications
based on identity.28 9 This might seem like an argument that contradicts her first
one, but it is not. Mezey made her first argument as a way to demonstrate the
negative consequences that have flowed from conflating sexual-orientation
identities and acts, in order to argue next that sexual orientation is really only
about acts. Because Mezey argued that there was no "act that defines a class,"
and instead only acts in which individuals engaged no matter how they identified, she argued that "sexual identity classification based on acts could mean a
more genuine and liberating correspondence between identity and acts that
would dissolve gender as the locus of sexual identity., 2 9 0
She examined bisexuality in order to argue for such an alternative classification system because of bisexuality's power to demonstrate the conflation of
sexual-orientation identities and acts. 2 91 The moment a bisexual performed a
sexual act, argued Mezey, the bisexual's identity was subsumed into whatever
identity that sexual act would indicate.29 2 For example, a bisexual who had sex
with a member of the same sex was considered homosexual and a bisexual who
had sex with a member of the opposite sex was considered heterosexual.29 3
Because the bisexual's acts do not track the way the bisexual identifies, classifying individuals' sexual orientations by reference to how they identify is not
useful. And because sexual acts derive classification based on the identity-based
classification system for sexual orientation, Mezey argued ultimately that sexual
orientation really cannot be ordered into classifications.2 94 After all, she argued,
"the social and rhetorical categories of heterosexual and homosexual fail even

288. Id. at 123.
289. Id. at 126 (criticizing court decisions that have found sexual orientation to be a characteristic
different from sexual conduct or behavior because they "essentialize[] sexual identity" and "bear[] little
relation to reality" (citing Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417 (S.D. Ohio 1994), and Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLICS AND SociAL THEORY 82, 91-97 (Michael Warner ed., 1993))).
290. Id. at 132. In this way Mezey's goal in proposing such a system of classification was different
from Janet Halley's, which also proposed the differentiation of people based on acts instead of identity.
See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
291. See id. at 98 ("Bisexuality is one valuable way of accounting for and articulating the discrepancies between those people who call themselves heterosexual or homosexual and the sexual acts they
actually perform."); see also id. at 111 ("The tremendous range of behavior that could conceivably be
categorized as bisexual necessarily makes the category itself mostly theoretical; because bisexuality
rarely, if ever, describes concrete behavior, it exposes the logical problem of moving too easily between
rhetorics of act and identity. What, for instance, would bisexual sex as an act look like?").
292. See id. at 99 (arguing that "'bisexual practices' are absorbed into both heterosexual and
homosexual identities").

293. See id. at 107 (describing this argument, which Mezey attributed to Kinsey).
294. See, e.g., id. at 122-23 (arguing that the Court in Hardwick reached its conclusion that the
privacy right implicit in the Due Process Clause did not confer a fundamental right to engage in
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remotely to approximate the actual range of human sexual activity, let alone
human sexual desire." 2 9 5
B.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION'S "ONE ACT RULE"

The reason that bisexuality has escaped the law's protective ambit-whether
as a result of bisexual erasure or a hypervisible effort to distance the LGBT
rights movement from bisexuality-is that it presents an uncomfortable mix of
identity and acts. Bisexual erasure had been observed when courts (a) conflated
sexual-orientation status with conduct (b) so that heterosexuals who had engaged in homosexual conduct would not be considered homosexual. For example, Mezey argued that in Hardwick, which held that Georgia's genderneutral antisodomy statute was constitutional and which was later overruled by
Lawrence, the Court framed the issue as one about homosexual sodomy, thereby
"wrenching heterosexual identity free of the act of sodomy while making
sodomy the equivalent of homosexual identity."2 9 6 And both Mezey and Yoshino argued that the military's former prohibition against gays privileged
sexual-orientation status over conduct with its "queen for a day" exemption,29 7
which permitted avowed heterosexuals who had engaged in same-sex sexual
conduct to avoid dismissal by demonstrating that such conduct was unlikely to
recur. 2 98 In light of recent victories-specifically the invalidation of sodomy
statutes and the repeal of DADT 2 9 9 -both of these examples have been rendered moot. But the inapplicability of these early examples of bisexual harm
does not mean that the more general problem that Mezey and Yoshino observedthe law's conflation of an individual's sexual-orientation status and conducthas been resolved.
Consider, too, the following observation about the shift from bisexual erasure
to bisexual spotlighting. Whereas earlier efforts to erase bisexuals conflated
sexual-orientation status with conduct so that heterosexuals who had engaged in
homosexual conduct would not be considered homosexual, current efforts to
spotlight bisexuals (a) conflate sexual-orientation status with conduct (b) so that
homosexuals who have engaged in heterosexual conduct are not considered
homosexual.
Yoshino analogized the "one drop rule" of racial hypodescent to a "one act
rule" of sexual-orientation hypodescent.3 00 The traditional rule of hypodescent

sodomy by "wrenching heterosexual identity free of the act of sodomy while making sodomy the
equivalent of homosexual identity").
295. Id. at 101.
296. Id. at 123.
297. See id. at 129-30; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 376, 458-59.
298. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3516.
299. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
300. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 392-93 n.211.
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provided that "'one drop' of African blood categorized one as Black""o' and
was applied by courts in the early part of the twentieth century, when almost all
southern states had adopted some version of it,302 in order to determine an
individual's slave status, responsibility to pay spousal or child support, or
ability to marry in compliance with then-applicable antimiscegenation statutes.30 3
Yoshino made the analogy between the traditional "one drop rule" and sexual
orientation's "one act rule" because of a comment made by Kinsey. 30 In
connection with his discovery that human sexuality could be explained more
accurately by reference to a continuum rather than to a division between two
rigid categories, Kinsey observed that the group that had been classified as
homosexual before his study had included anyone who had had even a single
homosexual experience, which according to Kinsey meant that someone who
had had even one homosexual experience would "[u]nder the law ... receive the same penalty for a single homosexual experience that he would for a
continuous record of experiences." 0 5
By focusing on the gray areas of sexual orientation, Kinsey was able to
observe that the binary view of sexual orientation-namely, that sexual orientation is organized into two discrete categories: homosexual and heterosexualdid not reflect the lived experience of sexual orientation. He observed, contrary
to the sexual-orientation binary, that sexual orientation was not black and white.
The impact of the sexual-orientation binary, in theory at least, could have
affected homosexuals and heterosexuals equally. But as Kinsey observed, its
real harm was done by the imposition of legal penalties against anyone who had
engaged in homosexual, not heterosexual, acts.
At the time Kinsey wrote, of course, laws banning sodomy had not yet been
held to be unconstitutional, the idea that homosexuals could serve in the
military was unheard of, and current antidiscrimination laws-which, despite
criticisms, do in some instances protect against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation 306-did not yet even exist. Yoshino expressed doubt about

301. Rose Cuison Villazor, Reading Between the (Blood) Lines, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 473, 473 (2010)
(citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26-27
(1991), and Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1738 (1993)).
302. See Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the
United States's Definition ofRace and Racial Classifications,48 VAND. L. REv. 513, 524 & n.71 (1995)
(citing STArEs' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (Pauli Murray ed., 1950)).

303. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1178-82 (1997).
304. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 392-93 n.211 (citing KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 55, at 647,
650).
305. KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 55, at 647, 650.
306. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAr. ANN. tit. 5, § 4591 (2002 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 10:5-4
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); see also Elizabeth M. Glazer, Essay, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102
Nw. U. L. REv. 1379, 1419-22 (2008) (arguing that despite graduating from its first to its second
generation, antidiscrimination law has failed to capture first-generation harms suffered by those-such
as gays and lesbians-whose interests went unnoticed until the second wave of civil rights).
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the validity of Kinsey's comment because of the existence of a law like the
"queen for a day" exemption to the prohibition against gays in the military, 307
which "allow[ed] service members to argue that they should be retained despite
homosexual acts because they [we]re really heterosexuals . . . [by arguing that]

the homosexual act was uncustomary behavior, unlikely to recur, consensual,
and did not demonstrate a propensity to engage in other such acts." 308 Thus, a
single "drop" of homosexual conduct would not-as it would in some states for
racial-classification purposes-ruin one's status in the dominant group and
cause one to occupy status in the subordinate group. But, as Paul Finkelman has
noted, not all rules of hypodescent measured literally one single drop of African
blood.309 Perhaps Kinsey's articulation of what Yoshino termed the "one act
rule," like the actual "one drop rule," was not often applied in cases involving
single acts.
Regardless, analogizing between the two rules helps to explain the shift from
bisexual erasure to bisexual spotlighting. The purpose of the rule of hypodescent was to subordinate Blacks. Thus, whether a court counted one drop or
multiple drops of blood, its purpose in counting drops was to preserve the
integrity of the dominant White race. The reasons for preserving the White race,
as opposed to the Black race, were not only that the former dominated the latter,
but also that the rules were being administered by Whites. In the context of
sexual orientation, despite recent victories, heterosexuals continue to dominate
as compared to homosexuals. But though the earlier effort to erase bisexuals in
the law was led by heterosexuals and anti-gay advocates, the later effort to
spotlight bisexuals in order to expose and remove them from the law has been
led by homosexuals and gay advocates. 3 1 0 "[T]he rule of hypodescent worked
to secure economic interests in slavery" 311 because a rule of hypodescent
assigned to "racially mixed persons . . . the status of the subordinate group."3 12
Thus, in the same way that the "one drop rule" did not seek homogeneity
neutrally as between Blacks and Whites, bisexual erasure sought homogeneity
among heterosexuals and bisexual spotlighting has sought homogeneity among
homosexuals.
Heterosexuals continue to be the dominant majority.3 13 Even so, the current

307. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 375-76.
308. Mezey, supra note 2, at 129 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1), which, as already indicated supra
note 298, has since been repealed).
309. See Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 954-55 n.95 (1993) (reviewing
ANDREw KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTTUTION (1992)) (arguing that while scholars have continued to
write as though a strict "one drop rule" existed "everywhere, at all times," in fact "[a]s of 1910,
Tennessee [was] . . . the only state to adopt the rule that 'one drop of blood' [made] someone black").
310. See discussion supra section 1m.B.
311. Adrienne D. Davis, Essay, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
695, 706 (1996).
312. F. JAMEs DAvis, WHO is BLACK?: ONE NAHON's DEFINITION 5 (10th anniv. ed. 2001).
313. Although this claim is not really contentious, it does bear noting that there is an ongoing debate
about the extent of political power that gays and lesbians currently possess. See David Schraub,
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bisexual spotlighting effort, which aims to distance plaintiffs who identify with
a homosexual status from any opposite-sex conduct in which they may have
engaged, has effected a "one act rule" that operates exactly oppositely from the
one Kinsey observed. In Kinsey's time, same-sex conduct made an individual
homosexual, subjecting him to all of the penalties associated with that status.
Now, opposite-sex conduct seems to render an individual not worthy of homosexual status, which would prevent him from benefiting from gay-rightsmovement victories.
But for two principal reasons, any rule that excludes bisexuals from protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is problematic,
whether that rule preserves homogeneity amongst homosexuals or heterosexuals. First, a one-act rule that preserves homogeneity amongst homosexuals or
heterosexuals effects the exclusion of bisexuals, who have experienced the
social problem of discrimination, 3 14 to which the law should respond.31 5 Second
and related, a rule preserving the homogeneity of either monosexual category
conflates sexual-orientation status with sexual-orientation conduct, thereby excluding from the definition of "sexual orientation" those groups, like bisexuals,
whose status and conduct are not identical.
C. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE PROBLEM WITH ACTS

Yoshino observed that one of the reasons for the erasure of bisexuals by
homosexuals was "a desire to retain the immutability defense . . . [which] has

exonerative force because of the widely held belief that it is abhorrent to
penalize individuals for matters beyond their control." 3 1 6 Because the bisexual
chooses between the sexes when choosing a particular partner (or so the theory
goes)," the homosexual who does not have the same choice has an incentive to
erase the bisexual because the bisexual threatens the believability of the homosexual's claim that homosexuality is immutable. Immutability is important to
homosexuals as a matter of constitutional doctrine because one of the three
elements tested in determining whether a group constitutes a suspect class,
therefore meriting Equal Protection analysis, is whether the group has a com-

Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection in the Gay Rights
Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437, 1461-65 (2010) (summarizing this debate in connection with an
argument against the use of political power as a variable in triggering heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause).
314. See supra sections III.B-C (providing examples of discrimination harms suffered particularly
by bisexuals).
315. See ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 30-31 (2008)
(explaining that in order for antidiscrimination law to protect a group of individuals, that group must
experience discrimination as a social problem).
316. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 405.
317. Yoshino acknowledged the possibility that individuals could be immutably bisexual but conceded that, despite this possibility, the bisexual would always be perceived to have had a choice about
partnering. See id. at 405-06.
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mon immutable characteristic. 318
The importance of immutability has been contested widely, particularly in the
sexual-orientation context.3 ' 9 Though not identical, the debate about the importance of the immutability defense to combating discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is closely related to the debate about whether to characterize
sexual orientation on the basis of status or, instead, conduct. If one's sexual
orientation is immutable, then discrimination for being gay or lesbian (or
bisexual, at least in theory) should be prohibited.
Tying protections to particular behaviors is not necessary under this theory
because any discrimination against someone on the basis of their sexualorientation status should be prohibited. Mezey argued for a classification system
for sexual orientation that was based on acts as opposed to identity. 32 0 Her
reasons for so arguing were convincing, but as she undoubtedly knew, there is a
high cost associated with moving to a sexual-orientation classification system
based on acts alone. Other scholars have also argued for the importance of
conduct-based classifications of sexual orientation (as well as of other protected
traits, such as sex and race).32 1 In Yoshino's other work, the highly acclaimed
book Covering, he argued for the importance of protecting conduct, which I

have summarized elsewhere as follows:
Civil rights lawyers and scholars no longer worry about status discrimination,

often referred to as "first generation" discrimination. In the "second generation" of discrimination law, the "smoking guns-the sign on the door that
'Irish need not apply' or the rejection explained by the comment that 'this is

no job for a woman'-are largely things of the past." The move from first to
second generation discrimination has been characterized as "progress: individuals no longer need[] to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied;
they need[] only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied."3 22
Yoshino observed that the frontier issue for antidiscrimination law to resolve
had become, in antidiscrimination law's second generation, the protection of
individuals who failed to cover the traits that were constitutive of their protected
status. Stated otherwise, Yoshino observed that antidiscrimination law's frontier
issue is the protection of conduct as well as status. The impact of his proposal

318. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). The other elements tested are whether the
group has been historically disadvantaged and whether it is politically powerless. Id.
319. See, e.g., Greenesmith, supra note 158, at 75-78; Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the
Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994).

320. See discussion supra section IV.A.2.
321. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 19.
322. Glazer, supra note 306, at 1419-20 (quoting Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 459-60 (2001), and YOSHINO, supra
note 19, at 22) (emphases omitted).
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has been enormous. 323 He described the failure of antidiscrimination law to
protect against the pressure to cover as its "hidden assault on our civil rights."32 4
As Russell Robinson observed in connection with a critique of Yoshino's
covering theory, Yoshino catalogued four ways that people tend to cover sexualorientation status in particular: "(1) appearance, including gender performance
or being a so-called straight-acting gay; (2) affiliation, avoiding gay social
settings like Fire Island in New York, and gay culture more generally; (3)
activism, eschewing the stereotype of the 'gay activist'; and (4) association,
including avoiding public displays of affection." 32 5 Yoshino also offered examples demonstrating the pressure to cover one's race326 as well as one's sex.
When discussing the example of covering sex, Yoshino focused primarily on
the example of Ann Hopkins, 32 7 the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,328
where the Supreme Court established the gender-stereotyping theory of sex
discrimination. As Zak Kramer and I have summarized elsewhere, 329 Hopkins
was denied partnership at her consulting firm despite a strong work record.33 0 In
rejecting Hopkins's candidacy, the partners at her firm criticized her for her lack
of femininity, even offering her the following suggestion to improve her chances
for partnership in the future: "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 3 3 1
Ruling in favor of Hopkins, a plurality of the Court developed a new theory of
sex discrimination, which has come to be known as the gender-stereotyping
theory of sex discrimination.3 32 According to the plurality, "we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their group."3 33 Under the genderstereotyping theory, employers violate Title VII when they base employment
decisions on an employee's failure to conform to stereotypical expectations of
how men and women are supposed to look and behave.3 34
Robinson criticized Yoshino's theory in Covering, which Yoshino applied to
323. A LexisNexis search of law journals for "Yoshino and covering" produced 418 results on
March 27, 2011.
324. YosmNo, supra note 19, at xi.
325. Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2007) (footnotes
omitted) (reviewing YosmrNo, supranote 19).
326. See YosmNo, supra note 19, at 111-41 (focusing on his own experiences as an Asian-American,
as well as that of Lawrence Mungin, a Harvard-educated African-American lawyer who assimilated to
White norms yet sued his law firm for racial discrimination).
327. See id. at 154-60.
328. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
329. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23, at 656.
330. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233 (discussing work that Hopkins had done that partners had
labeled "outstanding" and had remarked to be "virtually at the partner level").
331. Id. at 235.
332. See generally Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing GenderConforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 465

(discussing the gender-stereotyping theory and applying it to cases involving lesbians and gay men).
333. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.

334. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23, at 656.
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the categories of race, sex, and sexual orientation, on two principal grounds.
First, Robinson argued that refocusing antidiscrimination law to protect against
the pressure for minorities to cover the conduct that is taken to be constitutive
of their group membership risks the reinforcement of stereotypes that have
come to define members of that minority group.33 Second, Robinson criticized
the covering theory for its failure to reflect the various sources of demands to
cover. While Yoshino's theory focused on the pressure to cover exerted by
majority groups against minority groups (for example, straights telling gays not
to dress flamboyantly, Whites telling Blacks not to wear cornrows in their hair,
and men telling women to wear lipstick and skirts), Robinson uncovered two
other sources of covering: the self, and minority groups.3 36 With respect to the
covering demands that people tend to place on themselves, Robinson explained
that "[m]ajority norms can be so ubiquitous that they structure the preferences
of an individual without the person even being conscious of [their] impact." 3 3 7
Robinson also noted that in his account, Yoshino omitted minority-imposed
covering.338 For example, Robinson offered the following example of racebased covering demands from within a minority group:
I have found that blacks often expect other blacks to be "less black" or "more
black." For instance, middle- and upper-class black people often turn up their
noses at blacks who blast loud hip-hop music or "pimp their rides" (dress up
their cars in an ostentatious manner) because these behaviors are deemed to
be "ghetto." These pressures stem at least in part from the fear that whites will
see some blacks acting "ghetto" and think all blacks are "ghetto."
Yoshino justified his focus on covering demands imposed by a majority on
minorities in Covering'sfinal chapter.3 40 Yoshino explained:
In talking about classic civil rights groups, I have focused on the demand to
conform to the mainstream because I think that for most groups (except
women) these are the demands that most threaten our authenticity. But I am
equally opposed to demands that individuals reverse cover, because such
demands are also impingements on our autonomy, and therefore on our
authenticity. 34 1

335. See Robinson, supra note 325, at 1815, 1847 (describing Richard Ford's argument that
incorporating the covering theory into the law "would require mostly white male judges to define which
traits are authentically 'black"' and would further "create a 'regulatory effect' on people who fail to
adhere to norms of 'authentic blackness"' (citing RICHARD T. FoRD, RAcIL CuLTuRE: A CRMQUE 74-77
(2005), and Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1803, 1810-11 (2000))).
336. Id. at 1848.
337. Id. at 1815.
338. See id. at 1819-26.
339. Id. at 1820 (footnote omitted).
340. Id. at 1824 (indicating that this excerpt could be read as a response to Robinson's critique).
341. YosHINo, supra note 19, at 190-91.
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Though Robinson accepted Yoshino's justification for focusing on majorityimposed covering in Covering, he criticized Yoshino for "fail[ing] to tell us
precisely why pressure to conform to the norms of a majority community are
more threatening than pressure to conform to the norms of a minority commu-

nity."342
Robinson's criticisms of Yoshino were not meant to invalidate Yoshino's
covering theory, which Robinson explained turned on a metaphorical light bulb
in his head, helping him to "understand the deep-seated but hard-to-articulate
feelings of dissatisfaction that lingered long after [he] had come out of the
closet about [his] sexual orientation." 3 4 3 He explained further that "[e]ven
though everyone in [his] life finally knew that [he] was homosexual, some of
[his] closest relationships remained stunted and repressed" because he did not
feel free to share with his parents, for example, "how [he] fell in love for the
first time, how [his] partner was planning to move to Los Angeles to be with
[him], or how ultimately the relationship ended in sorrow." 3 " Robinson had to
cover his gay identity by hiding the "gay-related aspects of [his] life."3 45
For our purposes, it suffices to note that in Covering, Yoshino offered a
powerful account of the harms that individuals face by having to silence the
performance of certain conduct. Moreover, as Robinson noted in his critique of
Covering, minority actors also demand that members of their own minority
silence the performance of certain conduct.
D. A MODEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIVING IDENTITIES

In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court protected conduct. Specifically, the
Court held that Title VII's protection against discrimination "because of ...
sex" would apply in cases where an individual has been discriminated against
on the basis of gender-nonconforming conduct. 346 The logic in extending the
application of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination to cases involving
gender nonconformity was that if Ann Hopkins, a woman, had been a man and
had conducted herself as she had at Price Waterhouse, she would not have
suffered the discrimination that she experienced. 3 4 7 Thus, her discrimination
was because of her sex because the same conduct would not have formed the
basis for her discrimination claim had she been a member of the opposite sex.

342. Robinson, supra note 325, at 1824.
343. Id. at 1809.
344. Id. at 1810.

345. Id.
346. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("[W]e are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .").
347. See id. at 258 ("Thus, even if we knew that Hopkins had 'personality problems,' this would not
tell us that the partners who cast their evaluations of Hopkins in sex-based terms would have criticized
her as sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been a man. . . . We sit not to determine whether Ms.
Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is
a woman.") (emphasis added)).
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The gender-stereotyping theory introduced in Price Waterhouse has been
extended to protect the other disenfranchised group within the LGBT rights
movement: transgender people. 34 8 In cases such as Smith v. City of Salem349 and
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,35 0 courts have accepted an application of the
gender-stereotyping theory to protect transgender employees from discrimination. For example, Jimmie Smith was suspended from her3 5 1 job as a firefighter
after she informed her supervisors that she intended to transition from male to
female.352 At the time of her suspension, Smith was a lieutenant in the Salem
Fire Department, in Salem, Ohio, where she had worked for over seven years
without any negative incidents.35 3 By the time Smith decided to meet with her
supervisors to tell them about her situation, she was already "expressing a more
feminine appearance on a full-time basis," and her coworkers had begun to ask
questions and make comments about her changing appearance. 3 54 Shortly after
this meeting, Smith's supervisors hatched a plan to get rid of her. 3 55 Instead of
terminating her directly, they planned to order Smith to undergo three separate
psychological evaluations.3 56 They hoped that Smith would either refuse to
follow the order or resign.3 57 If she refused to comply with the order, they
planned to fire her for insubordination.35 8 After hearing about the department's
plan, Smith hired a lawyer, who contacted the department to inform it of
Smith's legal representation.35 9 Shortly thereafter, the department suspended
Smith for a twenty-four hour shift.3 60
Basing her claim on the gender-stereotyping theory that grew out of Price
Waterhouse, Smith brought a sex-discrimination claim under Title VII. Smith
alleged that she was discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypical
notions of how a man should look and act.36 1 In a break from a long line of
cases concluding that transgender plaintiffs could not raise actionable sexdiscrimination claims,36 2 the Smith court held that Smith's transgenderism did

348. See discussion supra section II.A.
349. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
350. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
351. Though Jimmie Smith and her attorney decided to use male pronouns for Smith throughout the
Smith litigation, this was a strategic choice made by Smith's transgender attorney, Miranda Bernabei,
who understood that Smith could never be seen by a court composed of nontransgender people as a
woman. Telephone Interview with Miranda Bernabei, Attorney for Jimmie Smith (Mar. 20, 1999).
352. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69.
353. Id. at 568.
354. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
355. Id. at 568-69.
356. Id. at 569.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 572.
362. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that
Title VH's prohibition against "sex" discrimination did not cover discrimination based on gender
identity); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (same);
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not prevent her from raising an actionable claim. 6 According to the court, the
analysis in these older cases had been "eviscerated" by the Supreme Court's
decision in Price Waterhouse, causing "employers who discriminate against
men because they .. . wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely [to

be classified as though they had] engag[ed] in sex discrimination, because the
discrimination would not [have] occur[red] but for the victim's sex.
In earlier work Zak Kramer and I have criticized the gender-stereotyping
model by which the employment-discrimination harms suffered by transgender
people have been redressed.3 65 Because some plaintiffs may be discriminated
against on the basis of their transgenderism-as distinct from their gender
nonconformity-we argued that transgender plaintiffs should be protected for
their transitional, transgender identity.3 66 We proposed a theory of transitional
discrimination, which would allow transgender victims of discrimination to
assert their transgender identities, rather than the sex classifications from which
they had run, in connection with their discrimination claims.3 67 But we made
sure to note that our introduction of a cause of action for transitional discrimination was not meant to displace, but instead to supplement, a claim based upon a
transgender employee's gender nonconformity, "to open up, not to close off,
avenues of available relief for discrimination's victims." 36 8
This Article's theory of sexual reorientation presents a theory of sexualorientation discrimination modeled on the gender-stereotyping theory of sex
discrimination. The gender-stereotyping theory has allowed Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to cover not only one's sex status, but also one's
conduct. For this reason, it can serve as a model-in the transgender context but
also in the traditional sex-discrimination context-for the protection of status
Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz Inc., 636 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med.
Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (same), aff'd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
363. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75.
364. Id. at 573-74.
365. See Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23.
366. To be sure, Kramer and I intended for our proposed cause of action for transitional discrimination to supplement causes of action for discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity for those
transgender individuals for whom both causes of action would apply. Because some transgender

individuals experience discrimination because of their transgenderism rather than because of their
gender nonconformity, a cause of action for transitional discrimination would capture the harms
experienced by these transgender individuals. See, e.g., Richard P6rez-Pefia, A Lawsuit's Unusual
Question: Who Is a Man, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/nyregion/
1lsexchange.html (describing a New Jersey case brought on behalf of transgender plaintiff EI'Jai
Devoureau, who was fired from his job as a part-time urine monitor because he refused his employer'swho had not known Devoureau before he began presenting as a man-question about whether
Devoureau had "had any surgeries" on the basis of the employer's having heard that Devoureau was
transgender).
367. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23, at 665-67.
368. Id. at 664-65 ("[Olur proposal that antidiscrimination law adopt an understanding of transitional identity does not preclude a gender-nonconforming transgender person from claiming that she
was discriminated against as a result of her gender-nonconformity. Transitional identity is meant to
open up, not to close off, avenues of available relief for discrimination's victims.").
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and conduct.
V. SEXUAL REORIENTATION
The Cuddle Puddle was not the most popular clique at Stuyvesant High
School in 2006, but they were not outcasts either. Whereas ten years prior in the
same high school halls "you might have found a few goth girls kissing goth
girls, kids on the fringes defiantly bucking the system," the Cuddle Puddle was
'a group of vaguely progressive but generally mainstream" seniors and juniors
like Alair, who was "well known" and well-liked at school.3 69 In this clique,
"[tihere [we]re girls petting girls and girls petting guys and guys petting guys,"
and they shunned labels. Ilia, a member of the Cuddle Puddle, explained that
the orientation of the group was "not lesbian or bisexual. It's just, whatever . . . ."370
These are the members of the "post-gay" generation.371 These are the individuals who make the law's current definition of "sexual orientation" look stale and
irrelevant. But even they cannot explain their own orientations or those of their
friends. As they said, the orientation of their group was "just, whatever .. .. "
But the law cannot simply ignore the dynamic nature of a category on which it
relies to determine whether discrimination harms are actionable. Somewhere
between the rigid categorical understanding of sexual orientation and an understanding of sexual orientation as "just, whatever," there is an understanding of
sexual orientation that reflects its dynamic, lived experience yet respects the
law's (and, arguably, humans') need(s) for categories. This Part introduces a
reconception of sexual orientation-a sexual reorientation.
A.

GENERAL ORIENTATION, SPECIFIC ORIENTATION

This Article argues for the separation of sexual orientation into subcategories:
it introduces and urges a distinction between an individual's "general orientation" and an individual's "specific orientation." An individual's general orientation is the sex toward which the individual is attracted as a general matter. An
individual's specific orientation is the sex of the individual's chosen partner. In
many cases the two orientations are identical, but for many bisexuals the two
often differ. 37 2
My argument, ultimately, is that the concept of sexual orientation is not as
textured as it could be. Currently, sexual orientation is understood along a
variety of axes-gender is of course the most obvious, but others include age,
369. Morris, supra note 27.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. The possibility remains, of course, that a bisexual's general and specific orientations need not
differ provided that the bisexual is attracted to a single intersex person. This possibility is discussed
further in Yoshino's article. See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 359-60. For further elaboration on the
intersex community, see Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?,
52 FLA. L. REv. 745 (2000).
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species, fetish, power, and number. Oddly, it is to a certain extent taken for
granted that individuals who possess a sexual orientation enter into relationships. But once individuals do enter into relationships, their sexual orientation
becomes irrelevant because we assume that their orientation conforms to the
orientation that this partnership signals. This was the phenomenon about which
Mezey spoke when she observed "how often and how easily 'bisexual practices' are absorbed into both heterosexual and homosexual identities."3 7 3 Thus,
sexual orientation is currently understood by reference only to an individual's
single existence, or alternatively by reference only to an individual's partnered
existence. The current understanding falls apart, however, when applied to the
obvious reality that individuals exist not only as individuals but also as partnered people.
An individual's general orientation is the sex-or the sexes-toward which
the individual is attracted as a general matter. Thus, one's general orientation is
the orientation one harbors toward the 99.9374 percent of the world with whom
one is not partnered. An individual's specific orientation is the sex of the
individual's chosen partner. Whereas one's general orientation may be toward
those with blue eyes, or women, or both men and women, that same individual's
specific orientation-the attraction the individual possesses toward the particular person or persons with whom the individual has chosen to partner-may be
toward someone with green eyes, or a man, or a woman. The distinction
between one's general "type" and the type into which one's partner would
fit-when the two differ, as they sometimes do-is an unremarkable distinction
when applied to a partner's characteristics that are not the partner's sex.
Moreover, the individual who generally likes people with green eyes does not
feel pressure to then declare that the individual likes people with blue eyes after
partnering with a blue-eyed someone. However, when a woman partners, for
example, with a woman when she has previously partnered with a man, there
seems to be pressure on her to reorient herself sexually, declaring that she is gay
as opposed to either heterosexual or bisexual. Of course, the woman may argue
that she is not bisexual, but only discovered her true sexuality later in life, as a
result of meeting a woman with whom she desired to partner. I do not mean to
argue that she is lying or that a discovery of one's general orientation is
impossible. I mean to argue only that the available vocabulary for talking about
sexual orientation does not capture the experience of someone who believes that
she is heterosexual or bisexual but is currently partnered with a woman.
B. APPLYING SEXUAL REORIENTATION

This section offers ideas about how to apply the distinction between general
and specific sexual orientations to cases involving bisexual discrimination.
373. Mezey, supra note 2, at 99.
374. There should be a bar on top of the last 9 here, to indicate a recurring decimal. This is not a
symbol that Microsoft Word, without an additional application, can generate.
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First, this section discusses an application of the gender-stereotyping theory
introduced in Price Waterhouse to cases involving sexual-orientation discrimination. Next, this section explains how the distinction between general and
specific orientations would apply to cases involving bisexuality, as defined by
desire, conduct, and self-identification.
1. A Theory of Sexual-Orientation Stereotyping
Sexual orientation is unlike sex in that not every state prohibits discrimination that is based upon it.375 But an opportunity exists in those states that do
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination to apply the gender-stereotyping theory
introduced in Price Waterhouse to sexual-orientation discrimination. The genderstereotyping theory introduced by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse and
applied to cases like Smith and Barnes, which involved discrimination against
transgender employees, is an example of antidiscrimination law's protection of
status and conduct. After all, Ann Hopkins was protected against the discrimination that she suffered as a result of her masculine conduct.
But as has been shown, antidiscrimination law has had a difficult time
protecting both status and conduct.3 7 6 And yet, the gender-stereotyping theory
has been successful in redressing discrimination harms for gender-nonconforming individuals as well as transgender people. 7 Thus it is worthwhile to pause
and consider the qualities that differentiate gender stereotyping from other
possible protections of status and conduct.
Ann Hopkins won her discrimination lawsuit against Price Waterhouse because her conduct was masculine and her sex was female. Therefore, because
her sex was not male, the Court concluded that discrimination for her masculine
conduct constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, within the meaning of
Title VII. 3 7 8 A transgender plaintiff such as Jimmie Smith was able to state an
actionable discrimination claim against his employer because his gender expression (his conduct) was female, which did not conform to his birth sex (his
status), which was male.379 Thus, even though as a general matter antidiscrimination law has been unable to protect both status and conduct, it has found a way
to do so in cases that involve gender nonconformity. Cases that involve gender
nonconformity have involved plaintiffs who have been discriminated against on
the basis of that nonconformity. Bisexuals share this trait in common with
plaintiffs such as Ann Hopkins or Jimmie Smith.
Whether bisexuals have been erased or spotlighted, the discomfort about
them is the same-some monosexual group, whether heterosexuals or homosexuals, wishes to preserve the integrity of its group membership by failing to

375. See HUMAN

376.
377.
378.
379.

RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,

supra note 14.

See discussion supra section IV.C.
See discussion supra section IV.D.
See supra notes 327-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 349-64 and accompanying text.
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recognize the possibility for bisexuality.3 80 This is further demonstrated by the
applicability of the "one act rule" in the sexual-orientation context, where one
or a small number of homosexual (in the case of erasure) or heterosexual (in the
case of spotlighting) acts ruin an individual's group membership in the monosexual group.38 1 Because individuals need not self-identify as bisexual in order
to experience discrimination for being bisexual,3 82 bisexual discrimination could
have happened to plaintiffs such as Sandy Stier, who might not identify as
bisexual. 8 In this way bisexual discrimination can be understood as discrimination on the basis of an individual's conduct (for example, sleeping with a
member of the same sex) failing to conform to an individual's status (for
example, heterosexual).
The law's expansion of the definition of "sex" under antidiscrimination law to
incorporate gender nonconformity can serve as precedent for the law's expansion of "sexual orientation" under antidiscrimination law to understand orientation nonconformity. Orientation nonconformity, of course, entails the
nonconformity of an individual's specific orientation and an individual's general
orientation. Because the "one act rule," whether enforced by heterosexuals or
homosexuals, is predicated upon the conformity of orientation statuses and acts,
this Article argues that it is fair to characterize bisexual discrimination as
discrimination for such nonconformity.
2. Broadening the Definition of Sexual Orientation
The application of the gender-stereotyping theory to the sexual-orientation
context breathes new life into antidiscrimination law's definition of sexual
orientation for two reasons. First, it protects against more discrimination that
actually occurs on this basis.384 Second, it protects against discrimination on the
basis of sexual-orientation status as well as sexual-orientation conduct, which is
a problem not only in sexual-orientation antidiscrimination law385 but also in
antidiscrimination law more generally. 386
By broadening the law's definition of sexual orientation, Team D2 players
Steven Apilado, LaRon Charles, and Jon Russ could successfully argue that the
NAGAAA's prohibition on having more than two heterosexual team members
definitively did not apply to them.38 David Boies and Ted Olson could have
skipped the portion of their direct examinations in which they inquired about
the stability of their clients' sexual orientations.38 8 Alternatively, if these attor380. See discussionsupra sections IIA-B.
381. See discussion supra section IV.B.

382. See discussion supra section L.A (offering various axes along which sexual orientation can be
defined, including but not limited to self-identification).
383. See discussionsupra section II.B.2.

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

See supra sections III.B-C (offering examples of bisexual-discrimination harms).
See discussion supra section IV.B.
See discussion supra section IV.C.
See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
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neys asked their clients about their sexual orientations, these clients could
answer that their specific orientations were homosexual but their general orientations, if applicable, were something else, such as heterosexual, bisexual,
asexual,'389 or something along Kinsey's continuum.390 And by so admitting,
plaintiffs would not risk exclusion by the LGBT rights movement.39 1
Moreover, the prohibition of sexual-orientation nonconformity against an
individual whose general and specific orientations differed would capture harms
suffered under the policy instituted pursuant to the NAGAAA's settlement
agreement. A prospective league member whose general and specific orientations conflicted might argue that the NAGAAA's policy demanded such conformity in its self-identification requirement for membership. The NAGAAA
might respond that membership would depend only on a prospective member's
willingness to declare that s/he is gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and that any
nonconforming conduct would not present a basis for ejection from membership. But of course, the ability to elicit such a response from the NAGAAA
would demonstrate the effectiveness of this new theory of discrimination.
Unlike its policy, a response such as this one from the NAGAAA would
actually protect bisexuals who exhibit the characteristic about bisexuality that
has caused society's discomfort with it, namely the orientation's failure to
guarantee conformity between status and conduct. Similarly, the adoption of a
theory of sexual-orientation nonconformity might provide an additional layer of
protection for bisexual noncitizens accused of having entered into sham marriages for the purpose of gaining citizenship on the basis of their subsequent
marriages to members of the opposite sex.
The application of the gender-stereotyping theory to the sexual-orientation
context 39 2 should not suggest that the only individuals whom this Article's
proposal protects are those whose status is stably heterosexual or homosexual.
One might object to this aspect of the Article's proposal because "the genderstereotyping theory ... has adopted a fairly rigid approach to a plaintiff's sex
and gender." 3 9 3 A corollary objection to the application of this theory to the
sexual-orientation context would be that, in order to apply the theory, one would
have to adopt a fairly rigid approach to sexual orientation. This objection is
unproblematic because the fairly rigid approach to sexual orientation is the
approach that the law currently uses. Thus at worst this application preserves
the status quo with respect to sexual-orientation discrimination.
389. Importantly, this Article is aimed at the protection of any individual whose discrimination arises
from the nonconformity between the individual's sexual-orientation status and conduct, in light of this
Article's demonstration that discrimination has arisen against bisexuals on this basis.
390. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
391. See discussion supra section II.B.
392. See discussion supra section VB. 1.
393. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 23, at 665 (citing Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregationof Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1995)

(criticizing sex discrimination law for assuming that male and female identities are different from
masculine and feminine identities)).
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C. SEXUAL REORIENTATION'S BROADER ADVANTAGES
Distinguishing between general and specific sexual orientations generates
advantages for bisexuals, sexual-orientation law, the LGBT rights movement,
and antidiscrimination law. This section provides three additional, broader
reasons that sexual reorientation is a useful reformation of sexual-orientation
discrimination law.
1. Naming's Necessity
Though he offered substantive reasons for the erasure of the bisexual,394
Yoshino elaborated on the problem as one of words. He explained that at the
outset of his seminar on Sexual Orientation and the Law, he led his students in a
discussion about, among other things, why conversations about sexual orientation tend to focus exclusively on heterosexuality and homosexuality, to the
exclusion of bisexuality. 395 He even argued that "sexual orientation classifications that only used the two 'monosexual' terms 'heterosexual' and 'homosexual' were unstable and naive."3 9 6 Yet as soon as the class moved on from this
introductory discussion, the whole class-including Yoshino himself-continued speaking in terms of a heterosexual/homosexual binary. Yoshino said that
he "found [him]self and the class falling back into the very 'unstable' usages
[he] had worked hard to retire-specifically the usages of the words 'heterosexual' and 'homosexual' as mutually exclusive, cumulatively exhaustive
terms." 397 He explained further that efforts to "us[e] the word 'queer' instead of
'gay,' or [to] add[] the rider 'or bisexual' to 'gay' . . . were token and fitful."3 98
Perhaps because of this problem, "[miany who would not deny that bisexuals
exist when the subject of bisexuality arises can nonetheless revert to the
straight/gay dichotomy when the topic shifts."39 9 Carlos Ball has said that, "[i]n
many ways, overcoming invisibility is the first step in successfully demanding
basic civil rights." 4 0 0 And as I have argued before, the act of naming is an
important step toward making visible those distinctions that even those who
perceive them cannot express adequately before those distinctions are named.40 1

394. See discussion supra section IHl.A.
395. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 356-58.
396. Id. at 357-58 (citation omitted).
397. Id. at 358.

398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learningfrom Brown v. Board

of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BRL RTS. J. 1493, 1534 (2006).
401. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Name-Calling, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (2008) (criticizing the practice of
using gendered titles (for example, Mr. and Ms.) in the law-school classroom to refer to students who
have not identified that they wish to be distinguished on the basis of their gender); Glazer, supra note 4
(urging scholars who write about the law as it relates to sexual orientation and gender identity to
consider the words they use to refer to their constituent group); Elizabeth M. Glazer, Seeing It, Knowing
It, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2009) (defending the need for the obscenity doctrine to make this
distinction explicitly before the Supreme Court confronts a conflict between Lawrence v. Texas, 539
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For this reason those who understand that bisexuals exist-and even Kenji
Yoshino-"can speak at length about bisexuals at one moment and then, in the
next, field a question such as 'Is X straight or gay?' without instinctively feeling
as if an important possibility-the bisexual possibility-has been elided."4 02
This Article's chief contribution is a set of words. Words that could have
helped Kenji Yoshino talk to his students about sexual orientation without
having to resort to the very binary he rejected. And words that can help the
LGBT rights movement, legislatures, and courts protect against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation as it is actually lived, rather than on the basis
of sexual orientation as the law has until now imagined it to be.
As a result, this Article may be perceived to offer something very small, for it
simply introduces new names for subcategories of sexual orientation that describe the way that individuals already live their sexual lives. But the act of
naming can be a transformative, albeit procedural, step in the process of
understanding the substance of concepts that are named. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, regarded as one of the pioneers in the exploding field of happiness
studies,4 03 commented on the fundamental importance of naming by invoking
basic and powerful biblical examples:
The simplest ordering system is to give names to things; the words we invent
transform discrete events into universal categories. The power of the word is
immense. In Genesis 1, God names day, night, sky, earth, sea, and all the
living things immediately after He creates them, thereby completing the
process of creation. The Gospel of John begins with: "Before the World was
created, the Word already existed . . ." . . . . All these references suggest the

importance of words in controlling experience. The building blocks of most
symbol systems, words make abstract thinking possible and increase the
mind's capacity to store the stimuli it has attended to. Without systems for
ordering information, even the clearest memory will find consciousness in a
state of chaos.
In the sexual-orientation context, the names that authors use to identify those
about whom they write diverge widely, and differ markedly from names used in

U.S. 558 (2003) and Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973)); Glazer, supra note 306 (arguing that the
obscenity doctrine should make explicit the distinction between sex and sexual orientation).
402. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 358-59.
403. See Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness,Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. Sci.
& TECH. 755, 756 (2008). Happiness studies have recently been applied in different and interesting
ways in the field of law. See, e.g., NANCY LEVrr & DOUGLAS 0. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A
GOOD LIFE INTHE LAW (2010); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037 (2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan
S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEo. L.J. 1583 (2010); Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the
New Economics Can Improve Employment DiscriminationLaw, and How Economics Can Survive the
Demise of the "RationalActor," 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (2009).
404. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLow: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OrMAL EXPERIENCE 124-25 (1990).
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earlier writing. Rhonda Rivera wrote about "homosexuals."40 5 Bill Eskridge has
written about "gays." 4 0 6 Mary Anne Case has written about "gay men and
lesbians." 4 0 7 Chai Feldblum has written about "LGBT" people. 408 Nancy Knauer
has written about "queers," a term she characterized as "the latest politically
correct term to come from a movement that has advanced from 'homosexual' to
'homophile' to 'gay' to 'lesbian and gay' to 'queer.' 409 Holning Lau has written
about the "sexual minority,"4 1 0 and later about "SOGI minorities." 1
To focus on one example, today, the word "homosexual" is one that is most
often heard spoken by people who hate gay people, who think that gay people
are ill, 4 12 or that gay people have an "agenda." 4 1 3 One might argue that the
name "homosexual"-as opposed to other names that authors and advocates
have used-has developed a negative connotation. A recent poll conducted by
CBS News and the New York Times showed that while 59% of a random sample
of 1,084 adults nationwide said they supported "homosexuals" serving in the
military and 34% strongly favored the same, 70% said they supported "gay men
and lesbians" serving in the military and 51% strongly favored the same. 4 14 In
addition, the term may have particular appeal to an older generation.4 15

405. See Rivera, supra note 53.
406. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS

(2002).
407. See Case, supra note 102.
408. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights andReligion, 72 BROOK. L. REV.
61, 63 (2006) ("I first want to make transparent the conflict that I believe exists between laws intended
to protect the liberty of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ('LGBT') people so that they may live
lives of dignity and integrity and the religious beliefs of some individuals whose conduct is regulated
by such laws.").
409. Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 142
(1998); see also GARBER, supra note 39, at 62-66 (arguing that the usage of "queer" is preferable
because of its inclusion of bisexuals).
410. See Holning Lau, Essay, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALI L. REv. 1271, 1273 n.9 (2006).
411. See Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity: American Law in Light of East Asian
Developments, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 67-68 & n.1 (2008) (explaining the use of this initialism,
which abbreviates "sexual orientation and gender identity").
412. See Gay Adjectives vs. Lesbian Nouns, THE NEW GAY (Sept. 18, 2008, 3:15 PM), http://
thenewgay.net/2008/09/gay-adjectives-vs-lesbian-nouns.html (describing guidance from the Gay &
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), advising media to avoid use of the term "homosexual," which is "overly clinical and presumed offensive").
413. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion is
the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to
the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.").
414. Kevin Hechtkopf, Supportfor Gays in the Military Depends on the Question, CBS NEWS (Feb.
11, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6198284-503544.html.
415. See Todd W. Rawls, Disclosure and Depression Among Older Gay and Homosexual Men:
Findings from the Urban Men's Health Study, in GAY AND LESBIAN AGING: RESEARCH AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONs 117, 129 (Gilbert Herdt & Brian de Vries eds., 2004) (finding that 21% of older gay men
studied thought of themselves as homosexual rather than gay or queer or some other classification, and
moreover, that 16.5% of men in their fifties, 19.8% of men in their sixties, and 51.3% of men age
seventy or older thought of themselves as homosexual).
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But "homosexual" is not the only name that authors and advocates in this
field have abandoned. Even the abbreviation that includes lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender people-"LGBT"-has been criticized for not being inclusive
enough.4 16 The shift in naming trends in this area of scholarship may explain
the presence in nearly every article of a qualifying footnote presenting to its
reader "a note on terminology"4 17 in which its author sets forth definitions with
which the author circumscribes the individuals whose protection the article
addresses. Those qualifying footnotes become throat-clearing exercises with
which scholars begin their lectures, defining the name that they will use and
explaining why that name, as opposed to alternative choices, is the preferable
name for the relevant constituent group. Of course, defining terms is common in
many areas of academic discourse. 4 18 But there are some notable differences
between the issue of naming in other legal or academic scholarship and in
scholarship about the law as it relates to sexual orientation and gender identity.
First, there seems to be an anxiety that attends the writing of the qualifying
footnote or the throat-clearing exercise in the area of LGBT rights. The hope
seems to be that readers or audience members will agree with a scholar's name
choice and will not discount the substance of her article or talk on the basis of
choosing a name that has fallen out of fashion. Second, the name choice in this
area of scholarship is not merely stylistic but substantive. This second difference relates to the first; if choosing an unfashionable name was only a difference in style and not substance, query whether the scholar would care whether
others agreed with her name choice.
The idea that naming is substantive is not new. Philosophers of language have
for some time recognized and debated the importance of naming. 1 John Searle
and Saul Kripke have debated the extent to which names are merely descriptions of things or are instead things in themselves.42 0 Searle argued that it is a
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necessary truth, for example, that Aristotle has the properties commonly attributed to Aristotle such as being the teacher of Alexander the Great.4 2 ' Kripke
argued in contrast that names must be "rigid designator[s]," meaning that they
have the same meaning in all possible worlds.4 22 In this way naming was, for
Kripke, necessary rather than contingent. They were contingent facts that
Aristotle taught Alexander the Great, that Hitler was the man who succeeded in
having more Jews killed than anyone else in history, or that a yard is the
distance when the arm of King Henry I of England was outstretched from the
tip of his finger to his nose. But when referring to Aristotle, Hitler, or a yard in a
counterfactual sentence (for example, "[S]uppose Hitler had never been born"),
the name ("Hitler") still refers rigidly "to something that would not exist in the
counterfactual situation described." 4 2 3 The name Hitler refers to something even
though characteristics thought to be essential to Hitler could not be true if Hitler
had never been born. Thus the name Hitler must rigidly designate the man
Hitler because sentences presenting counterfactual situations continue to have
meaning.
It is not my position that legal scholarship about issues that relate to these
groups-whatever an author chooses to call them-needs to refer to them by
only one name. It is also not my position that one particular name is better than
another. But names are important. Although this Article cannot capture fully the
debate amongst philosophers of language about the nature of naming, the
existence of the debate suggests the importance of naming. Just because naming
is basic-naming our children, our papers, and maybe even our cars424 is often
the first step we take to give them life and to make them our own-does not
mean that authors' name choices do not affect the substantive nature of their
claims. Of course, in some instances scholars of sexual-orientation and genderidentity law specifically delineate particular sexual minorities on which to focus
their writing.4 25 In other instances, however, the name choice is not made
because of a particular focus and is-and this is the problematic point-not
discussed.
This Article, which addresses bisexuality, has proposed a name change to
delineate subcategories within sexual orientation. Because naming is the first
step toward making visible those who are not, and making people visible is
arguably the first step in securing for them civil rights, this Article has perhaps
proposed something pretty important. An open discussion about naming might
421. See KRIPKE, NAM[NG AND NEcEssrry, supra note 419, at 74.
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spur an open discussion about whether and how, for example, the rights of
bisexuals and transgender individuals can or should be taken into consideration.
After all, if one chooses the name "gays and lesbians" as opposed to "LGBT" or
"SOGI," one makes a choice about who is included and excluded from one's
domain. But only once we initiate a widespread conversation about naming can
we highlight the substantive issues embedded in the names we choose. Those
substantive issues may include the conflation of general and specific orientations, which may in turn explain discrimination against those for whom these
newly named subcategories of sexual orientation are not identical. Conversely,
the naming and attendant disaggregation of general and specific orientations
may ameliorate such discrimination.
2. Preserving Categories
Our current vocabulary cannot save even the most well-intentioned individual
from the trap of the heterosexual/homosexual binary.42 6 Thus, in proposing an
alternative to that binary, one must be sensitive to this challenge. The distinction
presented in this Article can overcome this challenge because the words that this
Article introduces fit into the sort of rigid, binary, categorical structure that this
Article argues against. Although one might argue that this aspect of the Article's
proposal is hypocritical, one might alternatively argue that this characteristic
increases the proposal's likelihood of adoption into the general vocabulary and
collective consciousness. Moreover, the project of increasing bisexual visibility
is one that has generated these sorts of hypocritical responses from all of those
who have attempted it. Mezey admitted that, when trying to promote bisexual
visibility, "[tlhe challenge, finally, is pragmatic: to craft a reformulated vision of
sexual identity that is both socially feasible and politically viable."4 27 Colker
conceded that "[c]ategorization under the law . . . is inevitable." 4 2 8 And Yoshino
explained why his own logical and precise approach to sexual orientation was,
while arguably an ironic way of approaching something that defies logic, a way
of compensating for that defiance:
The logical approach of the article may be read as compensation for the often
parlously imprecise terms in which debates about sexuality in general and
bisexuality in particular are conducted. Yet the fact that it may also be read as
overcompensation is important. Sexual identity has always struck me as a
kind of illogic, given that sexuality is such a powerful solvent of identity, a
modality that expands the consciousness through shock and surprise. If this is
right, then bisexuality may be the sexual identity that best reflects the oxymoronic nature of all sexual identity, insofar as bisexuality, too, is a contradiction, a class and its own dissolution.
... [I]f we are concerned about the "logical" regulation of sexuality as
426. See supra notes 394-402 and accompanying text.
427. Mezey, supra note 2, at 133.
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failing to respect sexuality's fluid and narrative nature, we might do worse
than to begin by looking at the sexual identity-bisexuality-that best represents that nature. 429
Like others who have engaged with the topic of bisexuality, I wish to admit
openly that in order to best represent the interests of those who have been
excluded by the definition of sexual orientation, I have appealed to the definition's most salient, and most frustrating, aspect, namely its refusal to define.
3. The Categorical Protection of Living Identity
Moreover, the distinction that this Article introduces between general and
specific orientations answers the call in legal scholarship about sexualorientation law to characterize sexual orientation by reference not only to status
but also conduct. 4 3 0 A general orientation makes reference to an individual's
sexual-orientation status, whereas a specific orientation describes the way the
individual behaves with respect to a particular and current partner.
Arguments based on conduct, according to some, "more accurately reflect the
reality of lesbian and gay lives." 4 3 1 But, as Cain observed, "the status/conduct
distinction has met with minimal success in the courts.. .. [which] may be
explained in part by the fact that in most cases it is virtually impossible to make
a claim that the discrimination oc [clurred solely because of the plaintiff's
status."4 32
Classifying sexual orientation on the basis of status and not conduct is risky
because of an uneasiness about tying protections to immutability and also
because of the extent to which sexual-orientation status does not reflect the
actual experience of human sexuality. But classifying sexual orientation on the
basis of conduct and not status is also risky because it might be difficult to
determine why some conduct and not other conduct is protected without
reference to an individual's sexual-orientation status.
Distinguishing between general and specific orientations is appealing because
it characterizes sexual orientation by referring to an individual's status as well
as the individual's conduct. An individual's general orientation can be heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual while the same individual's specific orientation
might express the individual's act of partnering with someone whom the
individual might not have been attracted to as a general matter.
The debate about protecting status versus conduct has found particular application in the sexual-orientation-discrimination context with regard to whether to
protect an individual versus the couple. Another related longstanding debate has
existed about how to manage the tension between individual and group rights.4 33
429. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 461.
430. See discussionsupra Part IV.
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Group rights and individual rights are "[b]y their nature ... intertwined." 4 3 4 But
group and individual rights are not identical to each other. "For example, an
individual qua individual cannot demand self-government for herself only. But
individuals can speak on behalf of their group. Thus, an individual Native
American can assert a moral claim on behalf of her tribe, such as the moral
claim to institutionalize Native American self-rule."43 5
This debate, and the tension that goes along with it, have found particular
application in legal scholarship concerning the rights of gays and lesbians. 4 3 6 It
is of course possible to conceive of gay or lesbian identity individually (that is,
one individual person can be gay or lesbian), but commentators have identified
a few reasons why it might make sense to conceive of these identities relationally instead of individually. Consider, for example, the public accommodations
context. Both Sandals Resort and eHarmony at one time had policies that
discriminated against potential customers on the basis of sexual orientation. At
Sandals, a resort for couples, the policy prohibited any person from sharing a
hotel room with a member of the same sex. On eHarmony, a dating website,
members could not search the website for members of the same sex. Though
both companies eventually changed their policies,437 each company had presumably instituted its initial policy on the theory that the policy did not violate
public accommodations laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation because it did not deny access to gay or lesbian individuals
(as opposed to those same gays and lesbians in their coupled states). As Holning
Lau has argued, defining "access" under public accommodations laws by
reference to a gay or lesbian individual made little sense as applied to the
problem of sexual-orientation discrimination in places of public accommodation. If the unit for purposes of analysis is the individual, Sandals's and
eHarmony's policies did not deny access to gay individuals. Lau proposed to
change the analytical unit for purposes of public accommodations law from the
gay individual to the gay couple.4 38

434. Lau, supra note 410, at 1284.
435. Id. (citing Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 354-55
(1999)).
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lawmakers from across the globe." Andrew Noyes, It's OK To Be Gay at Sandals, THE ADVOCATE, Nov.
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dating website called Compatible Partners. Mythili Rao, eHarmony To Create Same-Sex Service,
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An individualist account of sexual orientation takes the individual as the
analytical unit. This account makes intuitive sense because not every person
who is gay is a part of a gay couple. However, as Case has argued, "[a]t some
point, it seems, almost definitionally, coupling or the desire to couple must
figure in same-sex orientation. In the words of the adage, 'It takes two women
to make a lesbian."' 4 3 9 Thus, it also seems to make some sense to analyze at
least some forms of discrimination against people on the basis of sexual
orientation by reference to the couple instead of the individual.
For the purpose of engaging with this Article, one need not pick between the
individual and the couple as analytical units. It merely bears noting that
distinguishing between general and specific orientations satisfies concerns on
both sides of this debate. One's general orientation describes one's individual
sexual orientation, whereas one's specific orientation describes one's sexual
orientation once coupled.
4. Protecting Against Covering Demands by the Majority and Minority
Lastly, distinguishing between general and specific sexual orientations has
the potential to quell Russell Robinson's concerns about Yoshino's covering
theory. As stated earlier, in Covering, Yoshino offered a powerful account of the
harms that minority individuals face by having to silence the performance of
certain conduct because of demands to do so by the majority. 0 Robinson
criticized Yoshino for failing to account for the fact that members of a minority
also place pressures on their own minority members to silence the performance
of certain conduct."' This Article has demonstrated that sexual orientation
law's "one act rule" has been enforced by both heterosexuals and homosexuals.44 2 By distinguishing general from specific orientations, individuals have the
freedom to sever their statuses from their sexual conduct. As a result, individuals can occupy a general-orientation status without fearing that their specificorientation conduct will ruin their status. Moreover, by severing the relationship
between status and conduct in sexual-orientation law, individuals can avoid
pressures from both heterosexuals and homosexuals to cover constitutive traits.
If the law adopts the reorientation proposal presented in this Article, the
incentive to demand covering of nonconforming sexual conduct will disappear,
whether that demand is placed upon bisexuals by homosexuals or heterosexuals.
Such a demand is unnecessary if the law protects against discrimination on the
basis of an individual's specific orientation that fails to conform to an individual's general orientation.4 3 Sexual reorientation names those aspects of sexual
orientation-General and Specific Orientations-the tension between which has
troubled members of the sexual-orientation majority and minority alike.
439. Case, supra note 102, at 1650.
440. See discussion supra section PVC.
441. See id.
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CONCLUSION
This Article picks up where Colker, Mezey, and Yoshino-who theorized
about bisexual erasure-left off by introducing a distinction between general
and specific sexual orientations as a way to redefine the concept of sexual
orientation under the law. The proposal presented in this Article should interest
not only bisexuals but all people with a sexual orientation. Bisexuality represents what is uncomfortable about stagnant categories of sexual orientation, the
kinds of categories that do not reflect the dynamic experience of sexuality. This
Article has offered a vocabulary with which people can express a specific
sexual orientation that differs from their general sexual orientation. Thus, the
bisexual who partners with a member of the opposite sex need not identify as
heterosexual, nor need the heterosexual who partners with a member of the
same sex identify as homosexual. For many people the freedom to differentiate
between two subcategories of sexual orientation is superfluous; their specific
and general orientations are identical. But for individuals whose specific and
general orientations differ-for example, the monogamous, partnered bisexualthis freedom can mean the ability to incorporate the range of their sexual
experience into a single cohesive identity.
If adopted, this distinction could help to combat the harmful effects of
bisexual erasure and bisexual spotlighting. Whether bisexuals have been erased
or are hypervisible, the law has been unable to address the harms they suffer
and the political LGBT rights movement has been reluctant to incorporate their
interests. Bisexuals are different from gays and lesbians because bisexuals
challenge the sexual-orientation binary to which gays and lesbians adhere. More
particularly, bisexuals challenge that binary because their sexual orientation is a
mix of status and conduct. Neither antidiscrimination law nor the LGBT rights
movement has been able to accommodate the protection of individuals on the
basis of their status as well as their conduct. Thus, it is unsurprising that
bisexuals have been excluded from legal protection and political recognition.
The observation that bisexual orientation is rooted in both status and conduct
explains why bisexuals have continued to suffer harms even though they no
longer seem to be erased. And the division between general and specific
orientations addresses the ways in which bisexual orientation-along with any
orientation that exists along a continuum of sexual orientation-is both status
and conduct based. By adopting this distinction, courts, legislatures, and the
LGBT rights movement can protect bisexuals from the harms they face. Moreover, antidiscrimination law can look to the conception of sexual orientation as
a model for the protection of living identities, which it has failed to do not only
with respect to sexual orientation, but also with respect to other classes deserving protection.

